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About the publication 
The publication is a product of the Open Society Institute – Sofia within the European 
Policies Initiative (EuPI) and the project “The EU New Member States as Agenda Setters 
in the Enlarged European Union”. This EuPI has been implemented in close partnership 
with EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, with project funding provided by the 
Open Society Institute – Sofia.  
The objective has been to map the positions and level of activity of the ten new EU 
Member States on a number of issues on the EU agenda; identifying the factors and 
drives behind these positions; looking at the level of political and public consensus and 
the influence of major stakeholders; outlining coalition patterns within the EU and, 
finally, trying to provide an outlook on possible change of these positions.  
The countries have been classified on each of the policy issues as “Policy Takers”, 
“Policy Killers” or “Policy Drivers”, depending on their particular position and level of 
activity. In the classification of this study, Policy Takers are those states that usually 
follow the mainstream in the EU and in general accept whatever is offered from the EU. 
The Policy Driver is a country that assertively promotes an issue at EU level. A Policy 
Killer is a country that actively opposes the policy in question.  
The research has been carried out by individual researchers in each of the ten new 
members on the basis of specially designed methodology, developed by EUROPEUM and 
major input from EuPI/OSI-Sofia. The seven policy areas under research are: I. Internal 
market/Lisbon Strategy; II. Minority integration and citizenship issues; III. Energy and 
climate change; IV. Budget review and CAP Health Check; V. EU foreign policy and 
enlargement; VI. Freedom, Security and Justice; VII. Institutional issues.  
The research was carried out primarily in the period September 2008 – December 2009, 
but there may be references beyond this period. Some positions and circumstances 
described in the reports may have changed since the information was last made 
available to the researchers or reached the stage of publication.    
The researchers’ findings are published in ten country reports on each of the New 
Member States: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
The structure of the country reports includes an overview of the country’s performance 
as an EU member and seven chapters following the seven broad policy areas. Each 
chapter contains an overview of the position of this country in the area, including the 
top three national priorities. Then the chapters provide in-depth analyses, information 
and prognoses on a set of issues (defined as general and specific) within each of the 
seven policy areas. 
A comparative report, based on the ten country reports, was produced to highlight the 
project’s findings.  
The views expressed in the reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the Open Society Institute – Sofia.  
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Call me European. 
The new member states’ quest for setting the EU agenda 
This report, based on ten in-depth country studies, looks at the 
positions of the new Central and Eastern European EU Member States 
on a selected number of issues on the EU agenda in seven policy areas: 
economic issues, minority integration, energy and climate, common 
agriculture policy, foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs 
and institutional issues. 
The focus is both on the level of activity and involvement in decision 
making as well as on the substance of these policies and the particular 
contribution they are making. The analyses also identify those focal 
points of interest and activity of the New Member States that punctuate 
the otherwise flat line of policy behaviour.  
The report attempts to chart a dynamic map of the enlarged European 
Union from the viewpoint of the New Member States, weighting the 
positions and actions, relationships and coalition patterns, the interplay 
of diverse motives in decision shaping, and ultimately outlining short 
and medium term policy trends.  
The EU according to the New Member States: an alternative reality  
Woody Allen once wondered what it would be like “If the Impressionists Had Been 
Dentists”. Now, extend this “what if?” approach to the EU, put the New Member States 
fully in charge and project what Europe would be like if their collective policy wish list 
came true. The shortlist of their preferences would include three policy packages: 
 The foreign policy package: a fast enlargement to the Western Balkans; 
a robust Eastern Neighbourhood Policy with a clear European membership 
perspective; and a one-voice Europe with a greater role in the world. 
 The energy and climate package: energy security achieved by multiplied 
energy production from more nuclear power plants and more diverse 
imports of resources; renewed commitments to expanded global climate 
rules, but a laxer regime in Europe. 
 The economy package: more liberal economic policies; freer movement of 
workers and services across borders; furthering the internal market; liberal 
taxation arrangements within the EU; fast expansion of the Euro area. 
Still very important, just slightly down the list is: 
 The institutional package: with fast track adoption of the Lisbon Treaty; 
modest competencies for the new president, a slightly better deal for the 
new “foreign minister”; a one-speed Europe for all and all possible checks to 
prevent the small states being elbowed out by the big ones. 
The wish list extended and explained 
A bigger and more dynamic EU: If the new members were to decide on their own on 
enlargement, Croatia and Serbia would be accepted in a matter of months. DG 
Enlargement would be busy processing the negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. 
Georgia would have enhanced relations with the EU, within a very dynamic 
Neighbourhood Policy.  
Revamping the neighbourhood: The Neighbourhood Policy would function as a 
preparatory school for starting accession negotiations with the Eastern neighbours. In 
general, the Eastern dimension would receive much more attention within the 
Neighbourhood Policy.  
NATO first: The new members would rather retain a “NATO first” approach to the 
European Defence and Security Policy. The ESDP would receive very positive treatment 
but no big investments.   
A more competitive EU within a greener world: It would be a nicer and cleaner 
world in general, as the big polluters such as India, China and the US would have 
embraced a new Kyoto Treaty. But Europe’s own restrictions would be more lax. This 
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would lure industries to stay and invest more in Europe rather than running away to 
other countries. With the “carbon leakage” sealed, there would be many more jobs 
created in Europe. In additional to that, the combined effect of more and cheaper 
energy to be produced and more industries in place would bring back Europe’s crown as 
the world’s undisputed economic power house.  
Energy for growth: Most of the cheap energy would be coming from a dozen more 
new reactors and entirely new nuclear power plants built in the region. Nuclear energy 
would have redeemed its place in the EU and would be seen as all but a green 
technology, environmentally friendly thanks to its lower greenhouse emissions. This 
would also be an incredible boost to the energy independence of the New Member 
States and by extension of the EU as a whole. 
More energy coming in: Several New Member States (mostly in the northeast corner) 
would have their energy security guaranteed, above all eliminating their and EU’s as a 
whole dependence on imports from Russia. On the other side of the line, several new 
members would have multiplied their imports and dependence on Russia. In both cases, 
this would be achieved by more pipelines coming into the EU — the difference would be 
the starting point.  
The EU economy: The New Member States would introduce more of the liberal  
 economic thinking (even in the global crisis 
context), sweeping aside unnecessary regulation. 
The Euro area’s rules will be revised to allow fast 
entry of the new members.  
Tax sovereignty: There would be no 
harmonisation of taxation in the EU. This will 
enhance the competition within the EU, and lower 
taxes will help the new members achieve their 
goals of catching up with the rest of the EU. The 
taxation issue would remain out of reach of QMV, 
so that it cannot be imposed if one state vetoes it. 
Free movement of workers: Any barriers to 
free movement would be lifted and the EU would 
achieve a higher degree of worker mobility. This 
action is part of the four freedoms of the EU 
(freedom of movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital) and would help boost the 
productivity of the Union. They would not bother 
about “employment policy dumping” vis-à-vis the old Member States.  
Free movement for services: The New Member States would further liberalise the 
free movement of services. They consider this will bring them a competitive edge as 
they have advantages in this area over companies from the old Member States.  
Improving injustices in agriculture policy: The new members would not revamp 
the CAP, but just tinker with it to prevent inequalities in aid between new and old 
Member States, as the new are getting some 5% of direct aid and the old the remaining 
95%. They would also increase money for the second pillar of CAP, rural development, 
but without ruining the balance.  
EU budget: Most new members, in a somewhat ungracious act, would scrap any 
rebates, hurting their formerly closest advocate for accession — the UK. They would not 
like to see any special “EU tax” as a way to replenish the common budget.  
The Lisbon Treaty: A new Treaty will be voted ASAP, no questions asked, to prevent 
last-minute revisions by the big power players. But one would still have to mind the 
Czechs.  
The EU power balance balanced: the new and mostly small members would seek to 
introduce enough checks and balances to prevent big states’ domination, including 
limited competencies for the new president, a high representative closer to the 
Commission, and retaining unanimous voting on key issues such as taxation.  
A humble president: The new president of the EU may finally appear onstage, but the 
position would be reduced to ceremonial duties. One of the major reasons would be to 
Votes 
in the 
Council 
Country MEPs 
(Nice, 2009) 
10 Bulgaria 17 
12 Czech 
Republic 
22 
4 Estonia 6 
12 Hungary 22 
4 Latvia 8 
7 Lithuania 12 
27 Poland 50 
14 Romania 33 
7 Slovakia 13 
4 Slovenia 7 
101 NMS total 190 
345 EU total 736 
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prevent the president from diminishing the role of the rotating presidencies held by the 
Member States.  
Zones of incompatibility  
While the list above says a lot about the zone of agreement between the New Member 
States there is an alternative list that outlines the issues of disagreement:  
The CAP scrapped: Estonia, with Lithuania joining in the longer term, is at odds with 
everyone else and would consider totally revising the CAP, scrapping direct aid 
altogether and earmarking the funds for forward-looking investments and technologies, 
rather than sticking with old-timer farming.  
Energy security through independence vs. energy security through 
interdependence: All the New Member States are trying to achieve energy security, 
but the ways to achieve this divides them into two groups. One group of new members 
is implementing measures for boosting energy production and diversifying supply routes 
in order to escape dependence on Russia as the main and often the only supplier. A 
smaller group of states pursues energy security through increasing the interdependence 
with Russia, with more supplies from it, as the thinking goes that the Russian 
Federation needs EU markets and money in the same way the European states need its 
energy resources.  
The jetlag syndrome   
While the lists above are drawn on the basis of new members’ policy preferences, 
positions and actions, more often than not they are still passive in the EU decision-
making process. Only part of the answer lies in the often tedious decision making and 
bargaining in the EU with the frequent outcome of a watered-down compromise 
solution.  
The new members are definitely experiencing a “jetlag syndrome” after entering the EU, 
characterised by capacity deficiency to formulate positions or promote them effectively.  
They might find it difficult to switch from the pre-accession mentality, where they were 
subjected to an asymmetric negotiations process, to the new mindset of members.  
This is a period of accommodation to the ways, coalitions and bargains in the EU. Lack 
of experience and expertise combines with a preoccupation with domestic problems at 
the expense of the EU agenda and the fact that the complex EU issues are tackled on 
expert level in some institution rather than through debate. Even the small 
representation of their citizens in the common institutions matters. And of course, the 
new members are also mainly small to medium-sized, resulting in fewer voting rights 
and less weight on the EU scene.   
Their usual response is to go with the “EU consensus”, assuming there is one, or 
alternatively the solutions are imposed on them.  
The other problem identified is the lack of genuine critical thinking and debate in these 
states. This may be partially due to the inherited reflexes from the pre-accession period 
of negotiation, as the EU policies are considered “instant models” — sort-of copy the 
policy or the law, add water, stir and use.  
But the jetlag explanation implies that this is a transitory effect, which will ultimately 
fade away. The more experience the countries accumulate, the more they join the inner 
circle of policies such as Schengen and the Euro zone, and with the expiration of the 
transition periods (such as the free movement of workers; or the monitoring of Bulgaria 
and Romania in JHA), the more assertive and involved these countries will be. This can 
be observed with the difference between the 2004 and 2007 entrants of the fifth 
enlargement, as longer membership brings experience, and holding the rotating 
presidency — as in Slovenia and the Czech Republic’s case — is probably the ultimate 
hands-on exercise.   
Are they really a company? Coalition patterns among the New Member States 
There have been increasingly frequent and increasingly effective coalitions between all 
or the majority of the new, post-communist members of the fifth enlargement. Factors 
such as similar problems, concerns and interests, proximity, comparable size and 
weight, socio-economic development and shared recent history play a role and may 
explain a coalition-building behaviour.  
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The coalition patterns between the New Member States may often be on regional 
configurations — the longstanding Visegrad Group, the Baltics, the Baltics plus Poland, 
Visegrad and the Baltics. The new members also cooperate with the small and medium-
sized countries in the EU as being more flexible or having similar interests. Poland is in 
a league of its own as member of the G6 — the six biggest countries in the EU, with the 
most votes, but it rarely prefers this format as too exclusivist. 
Germany is the most commonly referred partner among the old Member States, not 
only because of its weight and influence, and the fact that it is a major investor, but 
also because it is a close neighbour with similar interests. The UK and France also are 
among the major partners. The Scandinavian countries closely cooperate or coordinate 
with the Baltics and Poland.  
Will there be changes in behaviour? 
In the short to medium-term perspective, a radical departure in the positions of the 
new members may not be expected. While some change in form might occur, it will be 
not a change of substance. Formulated positions and preferences are unlikely to be 
challenged, for at least several different reasons. First, significant domestic u-turns in 
domestic politics are not expected to take place. Second, even if this happens, there is 
a more structural factor at work: there is still an “EU consensus” among the 
mainstream political players. The Eurosceptic trends in domestic politics are weak and 
are neither dominant nor influential. The mainstream parties may have “federalist” vs. 
“intergovernmentalist” inclinations, but both camps are pro-European and unlikely to 
reverse key policies. Third, the formulated positions and preferences are often devised 
behind closed doors by governmental institutions, not really following a vigorous 
political or public debate. Hence, they are considered a somewhat “EU transcendental 
knowledge”, immune to change. Fourth, the positions are “national positions”, implying 
that they represent the crystallised “national interest”, not party or interest group-
based as may otherwise be the case. Once in circulation, a “national interest” position is 
more difficult to change domestically.  
The likely effects of the global crisis: another try at forecasting 
It may be too early to predict how the global economic crisis will affect the “EU policies” 
(leaving aside worst-case scenarios of EU fragmentation) of the New Member States but 
it may be worth trying. As the world plunges deeper into the crisis, the New Member 
States have been lumped together with other adjacent countries — quite 
indiscriminately — into the economically volatile “Eastern Europe”, an epicentre of the 
next big crash. In reality, one has to distinguish between the countries outside and 
inside the EU, and there are marked differences between the new members themselves 
too.  
The economic strains of the crisis are definitely creating new social and political 
realities, as the governments of two of the hardest hit — Latvia and Hungary, were 
badly shaken.  
But the response to the crisis has tested the New Member States and the responses 
have been indicative. For one thing, as the row over the President Sarkozy’s call to the 
French car industry ensued, the new members confirmed that they will continue to 
uphold liberal economic thinking vis-à-vis creeping protectionism. The end of what is 
dubbed “market fundamentalism” entails for the Member States a complete swing of 
the pendulum in the other direction. Furthermore, some of them are returning into the 
sway of the IMF, which actually taught them the first lessons in free market economy in 
the early transition.  
The shared problems of the new members and the contrasting responses between the 
new and some old members have also brought the commonality of the New Member 
States once more to the fore, as they requested more solidarity and a coordinated 
approach demonstrated by the EU.  
On more practical level, the New Member States will need more than ever a more open 
and free European market of labour and market of services to pull them out of the 
recession. But as jobs at home are disappearing, the countries will reconsider their 
policies for attracting outside, third-country labour force. 
They will also become more assertive in seeking entry into the Euro zone, as this will be 
the ultimate anchor and antidote to financial collapse. In a somewhat paradoxical effect, 
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the crisis will help countries like Bulgaria and Estonia achieve the criteria for entering 
the ERMII, the door to the Euro zone, by pushing down their inflation levels.   
Don’t shoot the messenger: disclaimer on the purpose of the project 
This report is not meant to create dividing lines between “new” vs. “old”, “small” vs. 
“big” coalitions. The aim of the new members is ultimately to blend in with the crowd as 
“normal” and capable members of the EU, making equally important and legitimate 
contributions to the development of the European project. Therefore, this report, and 
the broader project it is part of, is intended solely to help raise the capacity of the New 
Member States to create equal and adequate authorship of EU policies.  
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A G10? The New Member States on internal market policies 
 At the time of devising the methodology of this report, the New Member States were 
still the “tigers” of the European economy. A growth rate of 6-7% to the staggering 10-
12% in the Baltics was considered rather the norm than the exception. As Lehman 
Brothers fell off the cliff, it soon became clear that the boom time was over for 
everyone. But as the crisis envelops the region, it is increasingly clear that despite 
country differences they have managed to maintain solidarity and a common approach. 
This was vividly demonstrated by a pre-Summit 
meeting of the prime ministers of nine new 
members in the Polish embassy ahead of the 1 
March 2009 Summit. .  
As the crisis continues, it may certainly be 
claimed that the group solidarity and common 
positions will solidify rather than wane. They have 
similar problems and need similar solutions at EU 
level for avoiding protectionism, for devising a 
new Euro policy, for opening the job markets and 
keeping them open, and for overall European 
solidarity in troubleshooting the crisis.  
“Anglo-Saxons” of CEE 
The new members are, with minor exceptions, 
exactly on the same page on most of the 
economic issues of the EU (Slovenia may deviate 
from the rule). Liberalisation and further 
completion of the internal market are their main 
points of departure in addressing these issues on 
EU level. All of them have been acolytes of liberal 
where they resist it.  
Despite economic thinking the Anglo-Saxon way and have brought that attitude with 
them into the European Union. It is no surprise to see the new members siding with the 
UK, Ireland and Sweden on most of these issues (that was before the continental 
Europe of France and Germany switched places with the UK and the US on the perils of 
unfettered capitalism). The description may not always fit them though, as they 
promote “liberalisation” selectively — which is the case with many new members in the 
energy sector that it is over with market fundamentalism, by all accounts the new 
members would rather hold to the “Anglo-Saxon” spirit — that is, against growing 
protectionism and state intervention.  
What is important for them? 
 
Three outstanding issues (among those studied in the research) confirm this: the 
support for free movement of persons, the free movement of services and the killing of 
taxation harmonisation within the EU. Their arguments contain much self interest, but 
they actually back policies that are very much in line with the very basics of the EU — 
the four freedoms: freedom of movement of persons, movement of capital, goods and 
services. In taxation, they would like to retain a competitive advantage over the old 
members, to make an even playing field to catch up economically with the affluent 
Western Europe.  
Growth in real GDP 
    Projection Estimate 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 
Bulgaria 6.3 6.2 6.3 2.0 
Czech 
Republic  
6.8 6.0 4.1 0.0 
Estonia 10.4 6.3 -2.3 -3.5 
Hungary 4.1 1.1 1.0 -2.0 
Latvia 12.2 10.3 -1.7 -5.0 
Lithuania 7.8 8.9 3.8 -2.5 
Poland 6.2 6.6 5.0 1.5 
Romania 7.9 6.0 8.0 1.0 
Slovakia 8.5 10.4 7.0 2.5 
Slovenia 5.9 6.8 4.3 1.5 
EBRD data and projections, 27 January 2009 
Euro area 2.9 2.7 1.2 0.1 
EC data and projections, Autumn 2008 
Priority Issues  Preferences  
Free movement of 
workers 
√ Yes, they support it very much and demand termination of the 
transitional periods, which impose barriers. 
Free movement of 
services  
√ Yes, they support it strongly as this gives them a competitive 
advantage.  
Taxation harmonisation X No, they overtly reject it, as this would damage their economies. 
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The New Member States were also very supportive, though more in the “Policy Takers” 
capacity, to an array of other policies related to the internal market. They supported 
merger regulations, Better Regulation and the EC Simplification Rolling Programme, the 
Small Business Act and developing integrated financial retail services as good moves for 
their economic development.  
There has been a general consensus on the policies within the countries, among both 
politicians and business players, and it is unlikely that the stances will change 
dramatically in the future.  
Read my lips: free movement of people and the new members  
The New Member States have been striving to get full access to the labour markets of 
the old Member States as most of them opted to close the labour markets to their new 
fellow Europeans. This felt as bad as it looked: first, the citizens of the new members 
cannot benefit from basic EU rights; second, the barriers severely limit labour flexibility 
and hence the productivity of the EU; third, the new members’ governments have hard 
times to explain the politically frustrating issue to their electorate; and fourth, the new 
members really needed access to the labour markets of the richer West, as this pushes 
down unemployment figures and replenishes the budget with remittances from 
migrants.  
There are actually three sets of issues related to the free movement of persons and the 
labour markets. The first one is the transition periods, i.e. the periods for which an old 
Member State may restrict access to its labour market. There is a 2+3+2 year formula, 
meaning that re-evaluation is done according to this formula and the restrictions cannot 
be extended after this seven-year period. The second one is the issue of different 
treatment of new member citizens and third-country labour migrants within the old 
members. The new members’ concern is that programmes such as the “Blue Card” may 
paradoxically give precedence to third-country labour while the markets are closed to 
fellow EU members. The third one is the opening of the new members’ own markets to 
attract labour from third countries, as before the global crisis some new members have 
had labour deficits because of their fast growth. Many have touted “circulation 
migration” mechanisms, but in the face of the economic downturn, they would now 
rather restrict access to their labour markets.  
As far as the concrete responses are concerned, they have varied within different levels 
of rejection of the transition periods and support to lifting the barriers. Three New 
Member States — Hungary, Poland and Slovenia — reciprocated by closing their labour 
markets to the old EU in a demonstration of defiance, but they lifted the barriers shortly 
after. The New Member States have so far shown solidarity with one another, as they 
supported the “open door” stance to each other. Only Hungary imposed barriers to 
Bulgaria and Romania. But the group unity may wane soon, as they first group of 2004 
entrants receives a different treatment from the 2007 group (Bulgaria and Romania). 
This is due to the different timing of expiration of the transition periods, and as the 
2004 group’s deadline will expire first the influence of the common interests may 
diminish. 
First come, first served: the free movement of services  
The New Member States are very supportive towards the free movement of services, as 
they consider they have a competitive edge over the old Member States in this area. 
They have all maintained liberal stances, despite accusations of “job” and “employment 
policy dumping” — e.g. companies based in the old members will be disadvantaged vis-
à-vis the new member companies and workers with their lower employment protection 
and lower safety standards. The whole debate is best exemplified by the Laval un 
Partneri case that started it: in 2004, a Latvian construction company working in 
Sweden raised controversies with the Swedish trade unions as it brought its Latvian 
workers to build a local school.  
All of the countries may become “Policy Drivers” if the issue resurfaces again.  
Policy Killers in action: the harmonisation of taxation 
“Tax Sovereignty” has been requested by the Christian Democrats in Slovakia, a 
country that has benefited a lot from its lower taxation level. This is very much the idea 
of all Member States and the key players in them.  
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The New Member States have revolted at the idea of taxation harmonisation. They 
reject the attempts at doing so, even linking that issue to the Lisbon Treaty as they 
demanded keeping the unanimous vote in the area of taxation, instead of introducing 
QMV (qualified majority voting), which might have imposed the rule some day.  
As lower taxation represents one of their key advantages in attracting investment and 
boosting economic growth, it is very unlikely that they will change their stance any time 
soon.  
On VAT (Value Added Tax) the New Member States support the principle of subsidiarity, 
i.e. they don’t mind others using various VAT levels as long as a common level is not 
imposed on EU level. In general, the new members prefer not to use diverse VAT levels, 
as this is often their major budget source and there is the danger of opening the door to 
corporate interests requesting the benefits of a lower VAT levels.  
Only the “common consolidated corporate tax base” stands a chance of receiving 
support from two new members: Hungary and, to a certain extent, Poland. The 
measures, directed at the EU-wide activities of big multinational companies, have been 
rejected by the rest of the new members, acting in the company of the UK, Ireland and 
Cyprus (no surprise that these countries joined forces in this case, given their economic 
policies).  
The New Member States are unlikely to change their positions. The freedom to define 
their own taxation levels is crucial to their economic policies, attracting investors and 
keeping budget revenues high. The global economic crisis may even harden their 
positions to keep them competitive on European and global scale.  
Comparative Policy Report  
www.eupi.eu 
16
Minorities: a minor issue on the EU agenda? 
The new members’ part of Europe is a patchwork of nations and ethnic minorities. But 
ethnic differences were suppressed during the communist era to be suddenly un-frozen 
during the transition period — adding the complex issue of regulating inter-ethnic 
relations to the already complicated agenda of political transformation.  
In the run-up to entry into the EU, the Copenhagen political criteria were the 
benchmark guaranteeing that the basics of liberal democracy were achieved — including 
the rights of minorities. However, the EU has not really been the primary venue for 
managing inter-ethnic relations and after the negotiation process it lost any direct role 
in minority issues.  
The new members themselves have been very reluctant to bring their ethnic issues to 
EU level. Even in the case of Roma integration, with a few exceptions, the New Member 
States attributed a supporting role to the EU — mainly as funds provider or copying 
models from other member states. In the run-up to entry into the EU, the treatment of 
Roma minorities was an oft-repeated and critical issue in the monitoring reports. But 
after entry into the EU, Roma integration was off the EU agenda and its role was mostly 
indirect — in case the national programmes on funds absorption earmarked money for 
Roma inclusion.  
As far as other minorities are concerned, this has been strictly guarded within the 
domain of national affairs — and the EU in fact never had any intention to venture into 
this territory, with the exception of more indirect measures such as anti-discrimination 
legislation or cultural diversity programmes.  
Proposed policies  Proponents and response 
√ Promoted by NGOs, Soros network as a driver, the Romanian 
and Hungarian governments  
Overall EU Roma 
integration policy, 
institutionalised on EU 
level  
X Negative response, due to concerns of escalating demands by 
other minorities  
√ Promoted by NGOs, Soros network as a driver, the Romanian 
and Hungarian governments  
European Roma Strategy 
X EC responded by report, but the lukewarm response was 
criticised by the Policy Drivers 
√ Promoted by NGOs, Soros network as a driver, the Romanian 
and Hungarian governments 
Roma Unit at EC/ 
European Agency  for the 
Roma X Likely negative response  
√ Using existing structural and cohesion funds Funding for Roma Policies  
X Alternative: a separate financial line; unlikely to be adopted 
√ Proposed by Hungary EU legislation on 
minorities X Likely to attract very negative responses across the board 
 
The Roma minority integration policies  
The understanding of the centrality of Roma inclusion is broadly shared, as many new 
members — Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia — 
are home to large Roma communities. The neglect of Roma integration issues during 
the transition, when they were the hardest hit by hardships, raised the spectre of social 
and even ethnic tensions. Roma problems are virtually the same across the region — 
exclusion, poverty, and discrimination, with severe health, education, housing and 
employment problems. With the new wave of Roma migrations across Western Europe, 
backlash against Roma has raised serious inter-state issues (re-imposing visas for 
Czech citizens, the more serious tensions of 2008 and 2009 in Italy, etc.) and made the 
Roma issue an EU-wide flashpoint.   
At home, national governments have been churning out programmes and action plans 
for Roma integration with varying success. While proposals have been in the right 
direction, underpinned by the understanding that these are social and not ethnic issues 
per se, they have yet to achieve convincing results.   
The largest leap in the area was made by launching a specific public-private 
partnership, undertaken by a host of NGOs and CEE governments — the Decade of 
Roma Inclusion (with the central support by the Soros foundations network as a Policy 
Driver). The Decade serves as the focal point and blueprint for government actions. But 
with the exception of Romania and Hungary, most of the new members with a stake in 
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Roma integration policies prefer to keep their initiatives and support on national level, 
avoiding an ambitious EU-level policy. It is the non-governmental organisations that 
remain the strongest advocates for EU action in this area.  
Elevating Roma integration to EU level: what are the proposals?  
Romania and Hungary, both home to large Roma communities, have been self-
appointed Policy Drivers to elevate the Roma integration issue to EU level. In Romania’s 
case, this came as a response to the 2008 backlash against the Romanian citizens of 
Roma origin in Italy. The only feasible solution seen in this case was to “communitarise” 
the issue by bringing in the EU.  
The rationale of the proposed EU approach and institutionalisation is to compensate for 
the deficits of the national policies. The proposed solutions are both at policy and 
institutional levels. There should be a comprehensive Roma policy — i.e. a European 
Roma Strategy. The EU framework should set minimal benchmarks and standards, 
serving as an external anchor to the various national efforts and spurring and 
monitoring these policies and efforts. There should be institutionalisation of Roma 
policies in a separate European Agency for the Roma and a special Roma Unit within the 
European Commission.  
The initial proposals say that they should not earmark special funds for Roma policies, 
as the current structural and cohesion funds offer enough opportunities for this 
purpose. Since the governments currently use such funds for Roma integration 
programmes, the assumption is that the EU-level policies and institutions will streamline 
and in fact channel the funds to the beneficiaries more efficiently (which may have not 
been the case until now). There is an alternative proposal to have a separate financial 
line for Roma integration policies.  
Response and feasibility of the proposals for the Roma 
The chances of institutionalisation of a Roma policy or a comprehensive strategy are 
very slim. The main counter-argument is that this would open the door to other 
minorities’ requests for similar treatment and further escalating demands. The concern 
is especially valid for the sizable Muslim minority in the EU, and as this would affect the 
big Member States they are likely opponents of any special minority treatment.  
The other issue is that in principle, the EU Member States, and especially the new 
members, are very reluctant to involve the EU in managing inter-ethnic relations. The 
concern is that “internationalising” the issue might lead to further escalation of 
demands and imposing solutions that would endanger national sovereignty. This 
includes even Romania: although a Policy Driver on the Roma issue, it is reluctant to 
raise other minority cases because of concerns over the Hungarian minority, treating it 
as an exception of a social character.   
The European Commission indeed did respond to the proposals for a special Roma 
policy by issuing a report on Roma inclusion in July 2008. But the report was more of a 
catalogue of existing measures and was criticised as being vague and indecisive. This 
indicates the general trend of the EU — to be very supportive but within limits.  
Other minority issues: treat with care   
While the new members of the EU have never reached the boiling point of the Western 
Balkans in minority-majority relations, there has always been much sensitivity over 
minorities. Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, Turks in Bulgaria, Russians in the 
Baltics are all very different cases. But there has always been a lingering concern that 
the instrumental use of minority issues might endanger national sovereignty — through 
irredentism, requests for autonomy or outright secession. Latvia and Estonia have 
citizenship issues with the Russian minorities in the country, most of which are still 
treated as temporary residents. But the issue has profound ethical and geopolitical 
implications indeed, as it is viewed as a direct legacy of the occupation of these 
countries by the Soviet Union in the last century. Slovenia has a similar problem with 
the “Erased” former Yugoslav citizens, though to a lesser extent.  
The interest in national minorities living in other states has prompted more active 
policies on the EU scene, such as Hungary’s drive to secure relevant EU legislation (e.g. 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights) with an eye on the rights of ethnic Hungarians 
abroad.  
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Different countries have opted for diverse models of inter-ethnic relations regulations, 
but Western liberal democratic standards have ensured the rights of the minorities and 
they have found ways to benefit. As a rule, the more sizable minorities in the New 
Member States (other than the Roma) tend to have strong political representation, 
positions in local authorities and often act as king-makers in the political process, giving 
them access to central government.  
By all accounts, the EU has been viewed as a power for good for mitigating inter-ethnic 
tensions, but the main leverage has always been its “soft power”. Neither the Member 
States nor the EU as a whole would like to have inter-ethnic relations brought to centre 
stage in the European Union.  
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The new members and CAP: just another new vs. old rift 
Cheaper by the dozen 
The New Member States do not want to see a substantial change in the Common 
Agriculture Policy (CAP), but this does not mean they are satisfied with the current state 
of affairs.  
Probably the two most outstanding issues are the increase of levels of aid and the 
inequality between the aid received by their farmers and the farmers in the old Member 
States. 2008 data says that the New Member States receive about 6% of the direct aid 
funds from the EU budget for agriculture. The remaining 94% goes to old Member 
States. In the second pillar of CAP, rural development, the new members receive about 
33% of the funds (estimates courtesy of http://caphealthcheck.eu/, 10 July 2008).  
The New Member States attach big importance to the agricultural sector, despite the 
fact that in many countries its share in their economies is dwindling. Still, the issue is 
politically significant, as large portions of the population live in rural areas and are 
employed in the sector (30% of the workforce in Romania, 15.6% in Poland, 12.4% in 
Lithuania), and food prices are a salient public topic. Thus the promise of EU’s direct aid 
and rural development funds is a key component of the domestic political debate.  
For the majority of the New Member States, the significance of CAP and the reluctance 
to radically change it ensues from the fact that CAP, and especially its first pillar of 
direct aid, is quite attractive, representing a convenient redistributive mechanism per 
se, in which they can benefit relatively easily.  
For Romania, the CAP entails a higher stake as it is aiming at the agriculture 
commissioner’s seat in the 2009 European Commission.  
 
Priority issues   Preferences 
Total overhaul of CAP X No, they want conservative reform (Estonia is an 
exception).  
Abolition of direct aid X No, they reject it. Estonia is an exception; Lithuania also 
would support it in the long term, but not now. 
Change the focus to rural 
development 
- They think it is necessary, but this should not be at the 
expense of direct aid (first pillar). 
Different levels of payments for 
“new” and “old” farmers 
X No, they want to speed up the measures towards equal 
payments as soon as possible.  
Historical reference indicators, 
resulting in higher levels of aid 
for old members 
X No, they want review of the policy for equal conditions 
between new and old and fair competition.  
Simplify the Single Payment 
System (applicable now for old 
members) 
√ Yes, they want to keep the SAPS — Single Area Payment 
System — that is designed specifically for them as long as 
possible, and then introduce a simplified Single Payment 
System. 
 
Coalition patterns in CAP  
First, there is the new vs. old members’ rift, registered above, and hence the coalition 
of the New Member States. Then there is the larger, and perhaps more important 
coalition comprised of all EU members with stakes in CAP. Finally, there is the mini-
coalition of the latest arrivals in the EU — Bulgaria and Romania.  
Debate on reforming the CAP 
The agriculture funds take a notoriously big share of the EU budget — currently about 
40% (61% in 1988, aiming for 32% in 2013). It takes equally notorious pain for the EU 
to negotiate a CAP reform, including the recently launched CAP Health Check exercise. 
The debate is basically about how big the CAP funds with the EU budget should be — 
with an intention to decrease and channel the money towards other policies. There is 
also the question of what the ratio should be between Pillar I and II of CAP — that is, 
direct aid and rural development funds, respectively. The first, simply put, is about 
supporting traditional patterns of agriculture, while the second entails modernising 
projects for the villages of the region. Finally, everything is boiled down to how much 
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PROPONENTS OF CAP IN THE EU 
NEW MEMBER STATES  
BG, CZ, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SI, 
BG + RO 
EE 
 
money each of the Member States is getting as a result of tinkering with the different 
items and mechanisms within the CAP budget. 
Things they like and things they want to change 
They are several issues on the CAP reform agenda. On the principled issue of what kind 
of reform is necessary, all New Member States but one insist on a conservative reform 
that will not touch the basics of CAP.  
Estonia is the revolutionary among the group as it would agree to abolish direct aid to 
farmers. But in Estonia’s case, the share of agriculture is miniscule — 1.8% of GDP in 
2007, down from 22.01% in 1989 — so it does not have the stakes the other countries 
do.  
Lithuania, while accepting the 
conservative approach in the short 
term, in the longer term is 
supportive of radical reform of CAP 
that would slash down the spending 
and may abolish the CAP altogether. 
The main argument of Lithuania is 
that this will safeguard the EU from 
the budgetary shocks of future 
enlargements, when more and more 
aid will be directed to new members 
with large agriculture sectors 
(namely, Turkey and Ukraine).  
While getting fewer funds is frustrating, getting no funds at all would be a disaster. The 
idea that the Member States should cover all or part of the costs now covered by CAP 
from their national budgets was floating around but has been scrapped for now.  
The new members support having more money for rural development, but do not 
accept doing that by shifting money from direct aid (Pillar I) to the rural areas (Pillar 
II). The solution to the dilemma is to increase the overall budget of CAP, which is not 
quite feasible in time of budget cuts.  
Fighting for a even playing field 
The inequality between new and old Member States is high on the agenda. Undoing this 
injustice, according to the new, should be done in the following ways: first, the direct 
aid differences should be narrowed at a quicker pace — from 15 to 50% annually, up 
from the current 10% pace. A coalition of new members — Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia — was established to 
advocate for it. In a similar attempt, they have been trying to change the so-called 
historic approach to direct aid for farmers (based on previous payments), which benefits 
old Member States.  
New members (Bulgaria and Slovenia) are also against setting a minimal size of lots — 
at 1ha — as their farms are mostly small. In Bulgaria’s case, the government also 
objected the setting a minimal size of aid allocations, as this would disqualify the 
poorest farmers.  
The New Member States also don’t favour cross compliance — the provision linking aid 
to fulfilling environmental, animal welfare standards, etc. — as this would put their 
small and poorer farms in a disadvantaged position. As they cannot remove the 
measure, they seek to minimise the damage through the transition periods. Bulgaria 
and Romania have formed a mini-coalition to push back the deadline to 2016 and to 
demand specific requirements to mitigate the negative effects on farmers.  
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“Drill, baby, drill”: the New Member States on the energy and climate 
package of the EU 
When looking into the positions of the old and the new Member States on the energy 
and climate package, an outside onlooker might jump to the conclusion that the old 
members are some “New Age” tree huggers and the new members are — figuratively 
speaking — still in the steam age in their efforts to boost industry. The old members are 
pushing for lower carbon caps and stricter environmental rules, and many detest 
nuclear energy. The New Member States demand fewer rules and boosting of such 
hard-core technologies as nuclear power and coal electricity generation. Thus the new 
members might fully subscribe to the US Republicans’ 2008 slogan — “drill, baby, drill” 
– implying a similar passionate support to energy sector policies associated with 
environmental concerns (the US case differed in the detail as referred to supporting off-
shore drilling; the new members probably would do the same, only if the had access to 
the reserves).  
The New Member States think otherwise. First, they consider that it is not them that are 
big polluters, as they easily covered the Kyoto Protocol requirements when their 
industries crumbled in the early transition. Second, they need laxer environmental rules 
and ample energy generation in order to catch up in terms of economic development. 
Their argument is that another EU policy to which they are already committed — the 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs — takes precedence over the new ambitious 
environmental goals. Third, for many countries energy security is a vital national 
interest to guarantee sovereignty.  
Policy proposals  Policy preferences and actions 
Nuclear energy √  Yes, they love it, some more than others. 
 They seek better attitudes at EU level and will go on with building 
new capacities. 
External dimension 
of energy policy 
X/√  Mixed record;  
 Formally, they all support it; 
 In practice, they pursue different objectives. 
Liberalisation 3rd 
package 
X  No, they don’t like it. 
 Three new members joined a strong EU-wide coalition to kill the 
proposals; a compromised version has been reached. 
Post-Kyoto approach √  Yes, they support it; 
 But want US, China and India on board. 
Greenhouse gas 
emissions and the 
Emission Trading 
Scheme 
X  No, they don’t like it; 
 A strong coalition built around Poland defied the proposals. 
 
Domestic political and foreign policy considerations are running high. There are also 
considerable business interests, as energy projects usually amount to billions of euro. 
However, it seems that the positions of the New Member States in their current shape 
have reached a level of political, public and business consensus, and abrupt changes 
are not expected.  
Nuclear energy: the more, the better 
Plans for new power plants and reactors are deliberated in practically every country in 
the region. The CEE states promote or are supportive towards policy change at the EU 
level, which would facilitate nuclear energy (Finland and France are building and 
considering new nuclear reactors; the UK and the Netherlands are considering the 
options and Italy has laid out ambitious plans; and even Germany’s politicians are 
thinking about it).  
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The nuclear powers among the New Member 
States: 7 out of 10 have nuclear power plants. 
The New Member States are trying to move 
nuclear energy away from its controversial 
political and environmental image to 
transform it into all but “green” technology, 
indispensable to economic growth and energy 
security.  
But they are by no means a uniform group as 
far as nuclear energy is concerned. The 
keenest are those with nuclear power stations 
in operation, that intend to enhance 
production either by adding reactors to 
existing sites or building new ones.  
Why nuclear should be good enough for 
anyone: arguments for policy promotion 
There is no uniform set of reasons for the 
support of nuclear energy as they vary from 
country to country, but the following list is 
quite indicative: 
 
 
 
 Energy security in general is often cited as a major factor. Nuclear power 
stations have large generation capacities (in some countries delivering more 
than half of the output — 56% for Slovakia, 70% for Lithuania, some 30-
40% in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic) and they do diversify supply and 
the country’s energy mix; 
 The external dimension of energy security is also an important cause, as the 
energy is produced domestically and presumably involves fewer foreign 
policy implications;  
 The electricity is generated at competitive prices, which would be good for 
the economy and consumers; 
 It offers a profitable source of income, presumably through electricity 
exports; 
 It is good for the environment, as nuclear power plants do not emit harmful 
greenhouse gases. In some cases, nuclear power plants are indispensable 
for reaching emission targets (as in Lithuania), when other alternatives are 
missing.  
Nuclear energy: what are they doing to achieve their goals? 
Since becoming full-fledged EU members, the New Member States have become more 
assertive in pursuing the vindication of nuclear energy. The interest in nuclear energy 
has already been translated in action in two directions: (a) promotion of policy change 
at the EU level and (b) planned construction of nuclear energy facilities.  
Bulgaria and Slovakia are probably the two most ardent proponents as reflected in their 
plans to develop their nuclear energy sectors. Bulgaria is constructing one new power 
plant in Belene, deliberating the building of two more reactors on the site of the 
Kozloduy plant, and there is a controversial ongoing campaign to reopen reactors closed 
under the accession treaty. Slovakia has plans for three new nuclear power stations: 
the third and fourth blocks of the power station at Mochovce, new reactors to replace 
the closed ones in Jaslovské Bohunice, and a new power station at Kecerovce.  
Romania is constructing two reactors and may develop a new, second plant in 
Transylvania. Also planning to add reactors to existing power plants are the Czech 
Republic (two at Temelin) and Slovenia (one in Krsko) and Hungary is deliberating on 
such an option. The countries that do not currently have nuclear plants are somewhat 
less enthusiastic, but their support is growing. Poland, Estonia and Latvia are discussing 
a joint investment scheme in Lithuania’s nuclear power plant and Poland is considering 
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Public support for nuclear 
energy, Eurobamometer 
297, June 2008 
Country Support 
% 
Czech Republic 64 
Lithuania 64 
Hungary 63 
Bulgaria 60 
Slovakia 60 
Slovenia  51 
EU average 44 
Estonia 41 
Poland 39 
Latvia 35 
Romania 35 
 
“outsourcing” a nuclear power plant in Western Ukraine or building two for itself in the 
country.  
Nuclear energy: the drive for policy change at the EU level 
The policy change promotion pursues a more favourable environment for the sector, not 
devising a common policy per se. Nuclear policy is a national competence and the 
decisions to have or not have a nuclear power plant depends on the Member States, not 
on Brussels: no one wants to complicate things by changing this. Its proponents want 
nuclear energy to be treated as an emission-free technology and further extend the 
argument to put nuclear on an equal footing with renewable sources (e.g. Bulgaria’s 
position). The drive to treat nuclear energy generation as being close to “green” and/or 
renewable technology” is not just moral vindication for the industry. It also has very 
practical implications for at least two reasons. The first is that, in case it is treated as 
“renewable”, there will be no need for further investment to keep up with EU 
requirements for the share of renewable energy sources. The second reason is that this 
would increase public acceptance, which is critical in attaining state legislative and 
financial support or third-party investment (the cost of a new nuclear power plant starts 
at EUR 4-5 billion), as noted also in the EC’s Update of the Nuclear Illustrative 
Programme of 2008, accompanying the EU’s Second Strategic Energy Review.  
Nuclear energy in the political and the domestic “European” debate 
The vindication of nuclear energy transcends its technical and economic rationale as it is 
part of more complex domestic political and foreign policy debate. For many of the CEE 
populations, the nuclear reactors also strongly relate to national pride, symbolising 
progress, economic might and even sovereignty.  
Nuclear energy was a big issue for many CEE countries in the run-up to entry into the 
EU. The requirement to close down reactors was part and parcel of the accession, 
enshrined in the treaties, in an effort by Western European 
politicians to alleviate fears in their states of the Soviet-era 
nuclear industry in the East. Many citizens in the candidate 
states perceived with bitterness the closing of reactors as an 
unfair bargain — i.e. reactors vs. membership — to the point 
that it was (mis)used as a political argument for Euroscepticism. 
The problems included frictions between neighbouring states — 
e.g. Austria vs. Czech Republic and Slovakia — and conspiracy 
theories, saying that the reason is to make way for Western 
technology and companies to sell electricity instead. Thus, CEE 
politicians remain under pressure from both the public and 
interest groups to re-energise the nuclear sector — and the 
politicians themselves picked on the popular issue to increase 
their public support. To be sure, there is no overwhelming 
political and public consensus in CEE countries, as independent 
policy experts, economists and environmentalists warn against 
economic folly, environmental hazards or dependence on third 
countries for the investment, technology and fuel (Russia, most 
of all). As indicated by the public opinion polls, the support for 
nuclear energy runs high, with the CEE countries as a rule far 
above the EU average.  
Nuclear energy was even linked to the institutional debate, with groups in Bulgaria and 
Slovakia saying that the two countries should have leveraged support for the Lisbon 
Treaty in exchange for permission to re-open nuclear reactors.  
The counter-arguments of nuclear energy sceptics 
The push for a stronger nuclear energy sector is not perceived equivocally in the New 
Member States and the arguments for its support have been repudiated. The economic 
benefits are countered by the high costs of investment as the price tag of one nuclear 
power plant starts at EUR 4-5 billion and the further multimillion costs for maintenance, 
purchase and disposal of fuel, etc. The argument based on “energy security”, including 
its external dimension, is also questioned, as in most cases a nuclear plant would end 
up with Russia supplying the fuel — exactly counter to the original aim to move away 
from heavy dependence on Russia. But increasing the legitimacy of nuclear energy at 
EU level will further erode the positions of its opponents at home. Environmentalists, 
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politicians and citizens who fear too much energy dependence, for whom “Brussels” has 
been the key ally, might lose another line of defence.  
Finally, with the global economic crisis hitting the New Member States hard, and the 
states and investors likely to be cash-stripped for years to come, some of the projects’ 
implementation may be pushed back for years.  
Single definitions that make all the difference: the External Dimension of Energy 
Policy 
For the record, all New Member States support a common external energy policy of the 
European Union, emanating from their concern over energy security as they are net 
importers of energy resources.  
But the problem is that they use different definitions of “diversification” for achieving 
“energy security”, ending up with divergent views on external energy policy. This is a 
case where the broadly-defined end goals have largely divergent, if not conflicting paths 
for their achievement.  
In essence, the difference is that one group considers that energy security is achieved 
by diversification of energy resources — that is, an adequate mix of gas, oil, and 
electricity generation, possibly including multiple routes for delivery. The other group 
thinks exactly the same, but considers that the sources and respective routes should 
have different origins.  
This difference is in practice undermining the announced will for a common European 
approach and is bringing about a re-nationalisation of policies.  
Nearly all of the New Member States are heavily dependent on the import of energy, 
and their biggest, and most often the only, supplier is Russia. This brings in a strong 
geopolitical and domestic political component of bilateral relations. The attitudes 
towards Moscow are anything but “business as usual” in the former Communist states, 
as they are burdened with historical sensitivities and current concerns of neo-imperial 
behaviour by Russia. Energy security and the external dimension of energy policy are 
defined to a great extent as domestic political debates as well as foreign policy, 
including neighbourhood policy, and ultimately shape the common European approach. 
The common ground in the external dimension of energy policy 
As far as the common ground among the CEE countries is concerned, it seems that all 
of them take the external energy policy and energy security very seriously. The Slovak 
government’s Strategy of Energy Security declares that the energy security threat is 
more serious than direct military or asymmetric threats, while energy policy is one of 
Bulgaria’s top three foreign policy issues.   
The countries have identical positions, supporting the development and implementation 
of a coordinated External Energy Policy of the European Union which would guarantee 
supply and better conditions for the delivery, transit and prices of imports as well as 
sustainable energy production and consumption. They all concede that the external 
dimension of energy security includes diversification of sources and routes, coordinated 
dialogue with the producing countries and consumers of energy resources, as well as 
with transit countries (as defined in this case by Bulgaria’s government). 
On a practical level, these positions and definitions translate into policies and projects 
worth tens of billions of euro. And when the gas crisis of January 2009 affected a third 
of the EU, it demonstrated that the “external energy policy” — or rather the lack of a 
common one — has a very tangible impact on the everyday lives of millions of EU 
citizens.  
Shared goal, divergent end results 
But the ways to achieve energy security are dividing these countries into two very 
distinctive groups. For one group of countries, dialogue with the producing countries 
and diversification means in practice a deeper cooperation with Russia and more routes 
to import Russia’s energy resources. Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia regard Russia as 
their main energy partner, which will guarantee Europe’s energy supply in decades to 
come. A former Bulgarian energy minister offered an interesting explanation when he 
claimed that “energy security will be achieved through furthering interdependence with 
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Russia”. This echoes similar European assumptions that while Europe is dependent on 
Russia’s oil and gas, in the same manner Russia is dependent on Europe’s cash flows.  
The sceptics say the EU’s own common energy policies are still a fiction, common 
projects are often inadequately backed both politically and financially, and that the best 
thing to do is to emulate what bigger and more influential states — Germany, Italy — 
are doing to secure their energy supply.  
The independence and solidarity group in energy policy 
On the other side of the divide is a group of countries, for which the primary goal of 
external energy policy and energy security is breaking away from dependence on 
Russia. Poland and the Baltics — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — have their historical 
experience and current concerns to make them more aware of Russia’s domination in 
the energy sector. The Czech Republic and Slovenia are following mid-way policies of 
decreasing dependence on Russia, but concerns are not so exposed.  
The Baltics are especially vulnerable as they represent “an energy island” within the EU: 
they are not connected to major EU energy grids, but are still linked to the old post-
Soviet system, dependent on Russia.  
Poland, again in the role of “super Policy Driver” here, has so far tabled three key 
proposals that would change the rules to a great extent. The first one is the 
establishment of an “Energy NATO”. Though attractive to many, it was rejected when 
proposed in 2006 as it was considered politically unacceptable. Still, the idea pops up 
now and then, possibly because of the connotation of confidence and efficiency that 
“NATO” brings with it.  
The second Polish proposal came in 2008, when the government proposed a revision of 
the energy solidarity clause so that an EU reaction would be guaranteed should a 
delivery from external sources drop significantly.  
The third proposal may seem the most simple, but makes all the difference. It is the 
definition of “diversification” that Poland successfully advocated for and was accepted 
by the European Commission. The definition says that there should be a diversification 
of geographical sources, not only a diversification of resources used for energy 
production. In practice, this means that a country should not only maintain (1) a 
balanced energy mix (the ratio between gas, oil, electricity from coal and nuclear, etc.). 
It should receive its energy imports not only (2) through different routes but also (3) 
from different sources — for example not just two pipelines from one source (e.g. 
Russia), but pipelines bringing oil or gas from a different country of origin.  
Policy and political implications for the energy policy 
The different approaches towards the external energy policy have consequences for the 
EU’s common energy policy in general as well as for concrete energy projects.  
On the normative level we may be witnessing a trend in “re-nationalisation” of policies, 
rather than a true common European policy. The New Member States, however, are not 
the perpetrators of the problem, as had there been a more coherent EU approach they 
would not have strayed far from the mainstream.  
On the practical level, huge projects such as Nabucco are being affected by the lack of a 
consolidated approach. The EU as a whole has failed continuously to act together and as 
long as such a complex and expensive project (at a price tag of EUR 7.9 billion) is out of 
reach of the new and small countries, they are going to choose other options as they 
see fit.  
It is often claimed that the gas war of January 2009 was a wakeup call and there will be 
genuine diversification, leading ultimately to energy security. This may be the case to 
some extent, but so far the initiatives are limited to small interconnectedness projects 
that can help in limited cases for a limited period.  
Liberalisation in the energy sector: thanks, but no thanks   
While the New Member States are carrying out liberal policies and support less 
regulation and more openness, some of them have been vigorously fighting the 
liberalisation of the energy markets. Bulgaria, Latvia and Slovakia have joined a group 
of Member States (also including Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece and 
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Luxemburg) seeking to kill provisions of the 3rd liberalisation package — advocated by 
strong proponents such as the UK and the Netherlands.  
The 3rd package aimed at achieving a truly competitive sector, including through 
minimising the domination of the so-called “national champions”, that is, the big 
national energy companies.  
The states that opposed the proposed measures were especially concerned about the 
“unbundling” effect, which would fully separate the ownership of the transmission grids 
and the energy generation. Latvia and Slovakia directly defied both the unbundling of 
ownership (the provision that the same company could not simultaneously own a 
distribution network and produce or supply energy) and the independent system 
operator model, which was offered as a middle ground.  
Other New Member States, while not so openly opposing the 3rd package, were not very 
happy about it. Estonia considered that without real inter-connectedness within the EU, 
the liberalisation would make little sense, but it did not go as far as Latvia to defy the 
proposals. Romania accepted liberalisation, but in practice went ahead with 
consolidating the state companies in the sector.  
The arguments for resisting the changes in liberalisation boil down to economic and 
geopolitical reasons. On the economic side, there were concerns about unnecessarily 
weakening the (usually smaller) national companies vis-à-vis the strong multinationals, 
as well as strong lobbying on behalf of these big companies. Geopolitical concerns were 
also at the top, mostly related to monster companies such as Gazprom and the political 
influence that accompanies it, endangering their national interests or security. 
In fact, the two arguments — weakening the national companies and third-party 
influence — were not necessarily linked or shared in practice by the countries that 
opposed the liberalisation package. They joined together, united by the same final goal 
but for different reasons.  
Reaching a compromise on liberalisation  
The compromise solution, forged at the 9-10 October 2008 Meeting of the Energy 
Council of the EU, in practice provided that the Member States could 
chose their model — either full or partial unbundling. This allowed the 
big companies — or “national champions” — to retain their power 
through ownership of the gas and electricity grids. But they would be 
subjected to an outside regulation and supervision. Companies from 
partially unbundled countries are also forbidden to buy grids in 
countries that have opted for the full unbundling model.  
The third-party clause — or “Gazprom clause” as it is also known — 
was introduced to oblige non-EU energy companies, operating in the 
EU, to follow the same rules as the EU ones. This aims to prevent 
them from undue influence in gaining control over distribution 
networks in the Member States. The initial (harder) option provided 
that the EU as a whole would be involved in the case, making it 
stronger on the negotiation table. The specific condition that would 
make this possible was the requirement that the country of origin of 
the company deciding to buy should provide the same rights to any 
EU company. The new — soft— option leaves the door open to 
bilateral talks and arrangements. 
The Czech Presidency in the first half of 2009 is continuing the talks 
on the package, but it will build on a compromise which is generally 
accepted, and complicated negotiations are not expected.         
The climate change and the new “Warsaw Pact”: this time 
victorious  
The “Warsaw Declaration” of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia in September 2008 is a case of coalition building over the climate change 
policies. They emphasised their contribution to the EU as a whole for reaching the Kyoto 
targets and that this has to be taken into account when devising the future policies of 
the Union. The place — Warsaw — is not a coincidence, as Poland has pooled the 
interests and efforts of the New Member States first to “kill” the proposed changes and 
Public concerns about 
global warming and 
climate change, 
EB69.2, September 
2008 
Country Support 
% 
Slovenia  80 
Hungary 71 
Slovakia 66 
Lithuania 66 
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Republic 
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then as a “super Policy Driver” to amend the policies in the desired direction. The 
coalition, led by Poland, united for common action again at the October 2008 European 
Council, and as the entire energy and climate package was in trouble, the presidency 
pushed back the deadlines in the hopes of reaching an agreement.  
In December 2008, Poland hosted a meeting between the presidency of the EU and the 
rest of the rebel group — Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania and Slovakia — which laid the ground for finally reaching consensus later in 
that month.  
The climate change package 
The European Union has been very proud that it leads the globe against climate change 
as it comes up with different policies aimed at limiting emissions. But a group of nine 
New Member States have, as recently as December 2008, achieved a victory in curbing 
EU’s new plans associated with climate change. This raises two questions: in the first 
place, what exactly does this rift between the New Member States and the rest of the 
EU implies, including the ramifications for EU’s entire energy and climate change 
package? And second, how it is going to impact the image and the consequent actions 
of the EU as a “green power”?  
To claim that the New Member States are “environmentally unfriendly” would be 
oversimplification. Yes, it is true that in general they advocate for laxer rules and warn 
that the EU’s efforts may undermine its own development through the so-called “carbon 
leakage”, that is, industries may choose other countries that are more tolerant to their 
business.  
On public opinion level, climate issues receive a great deal of attention from the citizens 
of the New Member States. In a recent Eurobarometer survey (September 2008, No 
69.2) the results showing concerns for the global warming and climate change were 
above or close to the EU average. As the respondents had to rate their concerns among 
eight global challenges (shortage of food and water, armed conflict, etc), in most cases 
the climate issues topped the list before other concerns. The countries with a lower 
level of concerns also had a lower level of information on the issues (Bulgarians, 
Romanians, Lithuanians and Czechs; it is an open question why citizens of Bulgaria and 
the Czech Republic perceived international terrorism as the main threat, with 70% and 
56% respectively).  
Yes to Kyoto, but mind the consequences  
A closer look at the matters reveals a certain paradox — actually the New Member 
States are very supportive of the Kyoto Protocol and the EU’s leading role in it, but they 
do object to the EU’s proposals for benchmarks for emissions and the Emission Trading 
Scheme.  
The reason for this behaviour is fairly simple. All the New Member States, except 
Slovenia, are successfully achieving the Kyoto target goals, but the EU’s newly 
proposed regulations would put a substantial burden on their industries. The stricter 
regulations, the New Member States reasoned, would severely limit the policies of 
“catching up” with the rest of the EU and leave them less developed, second tier 
countries. These positions as a rule enjoyed wide political support and the argument 
played well with the local public. The powerful energy and industry lobbies have done 
their best to prevent stricter rules. Foreign investors would not bid on a country that 
has fewer emissions quotas, in a process very similar to the “carbon leakage” concerns 
for the whole of the EU (i.e. the reallocation of industries to third countries with less 
strict regimes). Therefore, there is unlikely to be any change in their positions in the 
short and medium-term future.  
The new members have been a cautious voice in the EU on a too-zealous climate 
change policy. As the Czech Republic has argued, if the global effort does not include 
China, India, the US and other major players, then all the enormous efforts of the EU 
would be forfeit. If the EU continues to make sacrifices alone, its competitive 
advantages will be severely limited at the gain of only 1% decrease in global pollutions.  
Renewables 
In the related area of usage of renewables, there has been a similar reluctance to see 
strict rules, despite the countries having agreed to the set limits. There is also deep 
Comparative Policy Report  
www.eupi.eu 
28
frustration with the way the targets have been set, which would undermine these 
countries’ development efforts.  
The reasons for objecting to the policies are anything but uniform, as the countries 
have different starting positions and capacities. For example, the use of renewables in 
the Czech Republic (5% with a target of 14% by 2020) or Bulgaria (9.4% to 16% by 
2020) is viewed as difficult or unrealistic to achieve. They claim that achieving realistic 
goals is possible only if nuclear energy is recognised as an equally “green” technology 
as the renewable, as it does not emit greenhouse gas. Bulgaria openly lobbied for this 
and others vest their hopes on it.  
For example, Poland is certainly frustrated as its carbon-based energy sector and 
industry is in a very unfavourable position. Latvia shares similar feelings for all different 
reasons: it has already achieved well above the average 20% target, but it has now 
been required to reach for 40%. Latvia prefers that countries with current 20% and 
above usage should not be subjected to higher ceilings, as they have already made 
their contribution and an extra effort would damage their competitiveness. The average 
target should be around 20%.  
In general, there has been a preference for introducing more country-specific 
benchmarks, as the unified approach is not necessarily rational. In Estonia, the making 
of bio fuels has been deemed as creating more emissions than using carbons, and 
others, such as Slovenia, take the obligations more for their disciplining effect than with 
the realistic expectation that they would be met.  
Revised Emission Trading Scheme 
The revised ETS has also been unpopular with the New Member States. In the first 
round of the ETS, many industries from the new members decided to sell their quotas, 
rather than utilise them — for example, the Lithuanian ones saved 47.3% of the credits 
and sold 69% to other European enterprises in 2006. The Commission then halved most 
of the requested quotas, causing much dissatisfaction as the New Member States 
initially planned to invest the funds from sold quotas into green technologies. This was 
certainly perceived with frustration by national industries, which saw governments 
unable to stand for their interests — like in Bulgaria or Latvia, where the concerned 
business groups requested that the government bring the issue to the European Court 
of Justice. Similar requests were made from Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Estonia (as Lithuania has done before).  
The Slovak government also supported a system of benchmarks and their dynamic 
modification in specific sectors of the economy. It sought the decision on the list of 
sectors with a risk of carbon leakage as soon as possible, together with comprehensive 
rules and criteria for the risk assessment of industry delocalisation.  
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A region with a mission: the enlargement, neighbourhood and defence 
policies 
 
The common foreign and defence 
policies occupy a very high share of the 
“EU policies” of the New Member States 
and the enlargement and neighbourhood 
policies are the centrepiece of their 
foreign policies. This explains the 
attention assigned to these issues in 
domestic and European policy making. 
The issues are often closely related to 
an array of other policies —energy 
policy, the interest in national minorities 
residing in adjacent states, and 
domestic politics.  
The new members demonstrate high 
support for enlargement, high support 
for a more robust Neighbourhood Policy 
and a “one-voice” Europe with a 
stronger role in the world too, registered 
in the institutional debate of the EU.   
 
 
The location rule 
“Location, location, location” is the golden rule in the real estate market. It seems that 
a similar rule applies to the enlargement and neighbourhood policies as the New 
Member States are more interested in their immediate neighbours and seek to shape 
the EU’s policies according to their interests. All countries are active in one way or 
another proposing initiatives and trying to shift the EU’s focus south-eastward and 
eastward. Both the Slovenian and Czech Presidencies of the EU in 2008 and 2009 made 
strong cases for enlargement to the Balkans and deepening of commitments to the 
Eastern neighbours. 
 But at times this interest may be a double blessing, as it can go either way: either 
fervent and unconditional support or obstinate blockade towards their neighbour’s 
aspirations (despite that the causes may seem petty to the outside observer). Croatia’s 
case is indicative in this respect as it receives support from the majority of the New 
Member States but is currently stopped by its Slovenian neighbour because of a border 
dispute.  
The New Member States’ interests are reflected in two sets of preferences: first, for 
specific countries and second, for specific policies.  
Overview of the preferences 
The interest of new members in 
shaping the enlargement and 
neighbourhood policies can be best 
described as pushing the boundaries 
of the EU beyond their own external 
borders so that they would no longer 
be borderlands themselves or 
exposed to an unstable periphery. 
They want the enlargement to 
continue, and they want the 
Neighbourhood Policy to be made 
coherent and functional.  
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A bird’s eye view of the positions of the New Member States reveals that a handful of 
countries — Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Moldova — are considered favourites for 
enlargement. This runs against current realities, as neither Serbia nor Ukraine are 
candidate countries (Ukraine and Moldova are not even on the official list of potential 
candidates), but reflects the recognised interest and good will of their neighbours. 
There is also intense commitment to deepen engagement with Georgia to help the 
country pull through the grave current crisis and sustain its Western orientation. The 
opening of negotiations with Macedonia is also supported, provided the country 
demonstrates political stability (hopefully it did so at the last presidential elections of 
2009) and resolves the name debate with Greece.  
An unexpected side effect: coupling of enlargement and neighbourhood policies 
As these drives take shape, there have been somewhat unexpected outcomes. The pace 
and scope of EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans has received an external 
impetus with reasons partially or fully unrelated to their local dynamics. A host of New 
Member States want the Western Balkans in the EU as soon as possible, in order to 
open the way for a next round of enlargement — this time to the current “Eastern 
neighbourhood” countries such as Ukraine and Moldova.  
As this argument goes (Lithuania is indicative of this school of thought), the quicker the 
Western Balkans enter the EU, the sooner a next round of enlargement towards the 
current Eastern neighbourhood neighbours may be started. The accession would also be 
used as a case study and a precedent to advance the cause of another country. The 
Republic of Macedonia is seen as such an example for Moldova because of its similar 
size or maybe problems. Turkey’s and Ukraine’s perspectives have often been compared 
and linked. The Western Balkans region’s fortune is seen as a precursor of that of the 
current Eastern neighbourhood countries.  
Expanding or consolidating?  
There is one school of thought, as in the German Christian Democrats’ programme of 
March 2009, that says a consolidation of the EU’s identity and institutions is necessary 
before proceeding with any enlargement (Croatia excluded). Alarmed by the drawbacks 
of Bulgaria and Romania’s accession, the political turmoil in the Western Balkans and 
the post-Soviet space, and mired in the ongoing economic crisis, the EU is no mood to 
think about expansion.  
But ultimately, the new members’ position on the strategic significance of enlargement 
and further commitments to the EU’s neighbourhood may win the day — after all, it was 
Germany’s recent presidency that bolstered a new Eastern policy.  
Not as fast as it seems 
The drive to enlarge does not blindfold the New Member States. Formally, there are 
only two candidate countries in the Western Balkans — Croatia and Macedonia, but 
Skopje has not even received a date for starting negotiations yet. The other countries 
are considered potential candidates only, so in practice the EU enlargement towards the 
region is not foreseen in the short term.  
A closer look at their positions reveals an approach that takes into consideration the 
positions of their counterparts in the EU, as they realise the futility of efforts without the 
heavyweights on their side. There is a complex interplay with other policies and 
considerations too: energy security and relations with Russia in the case of the Eastern 
policies. Domestic politics in the New Member States also have a critical impact on the 
policy choices made and the levels of enthusiasm.  
The progress towards reform of the candidate and potential candidates is also taken 
into account as a token of their own commitment to accession or deeper relations with 
the EU. The progress is often measured against the benchmarks of the new members’ 
own experiences in the accession process. This means that no short cuts to membership 
with laxer rules would be accepted. 
The final outcome is a more nuanced approach that is intended to keep the flame of the 
debate alive, to keep the door open so that the reform process in the neighbouring 
countries can continue. This is probably one of the key lessons learned from their own 
reform and accession processes — the value of the presence of an anchor such as the 
EU.  
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Proselytes: arguments for enlargement and neighbourhood policies 
The New Member States — governments and the public alike — are very supportive and 
even enthusiastic about further enlargement or consolidating the neighbourhood 
policies. There is a legitimate question why they do that, despite the understanding that 
their counterparts in the West are less than keen to make further commitments in that 
direction and get entangled in activities they find controversial. The new members’ 
arguments for enlargement and neighbourhood policies are essential for understanding 
the policy choices they make.  
First, these states are located on the periphery of the EU and they feel vulnerable to 
outside shocks and spill-over effects. Therefore, there is a drive to stabilise adjacent 
countries through greater involvement of the EU, either through the enlargement 
process or the enhanced Neighbourhood Policy. For the countries around the Balkans, 
the challenge is political instability, interethnic volatility and unfinished state 
fragmentation. For those further East, there is the apprehension of a more assertive 
and unpredictable Russia. Helping their neighbours is a way to prevent geopolitical 
ruptures next door.  
Second, energy security features high on the agenda, as the majority of the New 
Member States are dependent on energy imports from Russia. These imports are 
transited through the neighbourhood states, and guaranteeing the transit routes is 
essential. In fact, this is a major argument for “selling” neighbourhood policies to the 
EU as a whole.  
Third, there is definitely a sense of solidarity and idealistic mission in the New Member 
States to help their neighbours advance on the accession or neighbourhood path. This is 
equally shared by governments and civil society organisations, who are often drivers of 
enlargement or neighbourhood policies, warning of another Iron Curtain that might cut 
off the natural economic, trade and human flows. 
Fourth, the own experience of the New Member States is that the best medicine for 
transforming a country is the enlargement process per se. They know that the 
conditionality applied in the accession negotiations far exceeds the leverages in the 
Neighbourhood Policy. This tips the balance towards favouring enlargement — or the 
promise of enlargement — over other, less assertive options.  
Croatia 71 73 56 53 58 80 68 70 57 79 52 
Kosovo 43 27 38 34 37 37 44 50 55 32 34 
Macedonia 67 43 53 44 49 45 53 61 72 50 40 
Serbia 68 36 43 39 46 37 50 63 62 45 38 
Turkey 42 34 34 34 36 45 43 61 49 27 31 
Ukraine 72 41 66 58 69 48 73 63 63 53 43 
  BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK EU27 
Public  preferences in new members for neighbors accession , EB 69 data 2008 
 
Fifth, the New Member States have found their own “niche” in the EU’s division of 
labour. They contribute enlargement and neighbourhood policies by offering their 
regional expertise and special relations with the neighbours. As small and medium-sized 
countries, their entire foreign policies revolve around the relations with their 
neighbours.  
Finally, public opinion in the New Member States supports the case for enlargement — 
as a rule their support rates are above the EU 27 average. Ukraine is favoured by Poles, 
Serbia are favoured by Bulgaria’s citizens, Macedonia and Kosovo by Slovenia, Croatia 
is the champion for Hungarians and Turkey among Romanians.   
The domestic factor in shaping foreign policies 
The enlargement and Neighbourhood policy choices are presented as elicited on the 
basis of long-term, firmly set “national interests”. Although this may hold true and there 
is relative consensus, in most cases it is domestic politics that take precedence in the 
decision-making process. The political divides in a country often include and may 
revolve around a foreign policy issue. Political shifts may well change the level of 
activity as well as the substance of a policy position.  
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The most vivid example of domestic policy considerations in the foreign policy of the 
New Member States is any policy that concerns Russia in one way or another. Then all 
the historical and political sensitivities come to the fore of the policy debate. As a rule, 
there is a clear left–right divide, with the left parties espousing a more reconciliatory 
tone and the centre-right more assertive and proactive.  
Economic interests also have a fair amount of influence in the decision-making process. 
As energy policies are pivotal in the New Member States, the energy policies impact 
greatly foreign policy choices. There is an assumption that countries with closer energy 
cooperation with Russia are much less prone to support assertive neighbourhood 
policies.  
Identity politics also greatly influence the decision-making process. Ethnic minority 
parties try to influence political decisions in favour of their kin country (Russians in the 
Baltics, the Turkish minority in Bulgaria). Conversely, there may be a nationalist 
backlash in the opposite direction.  
The “new” New Member States: the Western Balkans 
The Balkans are a special place for the European Union. The turmoil of the 1990s was 
essential for giving birth to and shaping EU’s common foreign policy. The region has 
remained a test case for Europe’s ability to act together and project capacity for post-
conflict reconstruction and stabilisation efforts. Now the Balkans are also the test field 
for the second wave of acceding post-Communist states after those in Central Europe, 
the Baltics, Bulgaria and Romania.  
The Balkans receive steady attention and support from their immediate neighbours.  
Slovenia, as the clear Policy Driver (or Killer in the case of Croatia), made the European 
perspective of the Balkans the centrepiece of its presidency in the first half of 2008. 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania are immediate neighbours but there is also very active 
interest on behalf of Slovakia and the Czech Republic — which at some point may even 
grow because of Slovakia’s engagement in the Balkans (with the EU’s High 
Representative in BiH) and the Czech Republic becoming more active because of its EU 
presidency in the first half of 2009. 
Croatia gets supports from virtually all New Member States. It is not only seen as the 
most advanced country in the accession process, but does not carry any negative 
associations as other countries do (e.g. political instability, institutional weakness or 
criminality). It is widely expected to end negotiations during the Swedish presidency of 
the EU in the second half of 2009 and join soon after that.  
The somewhat unexpected support to the Western Balkans by a host of New Member 
States further in the north may play a key role.  
The division line: Kosovo 
The issue of Kosovo proved to be quite controversial among New Member States.  When 
Kosovo declared independence in 2008, there was no “EU consensus” to hide behind. 
They had to takes sides between Serbia and Kosovo, often to choose between their 
specific position and the need for European and transatlantic unity, between different 
interpretations of the “inviolability of borders” principle in the modern context. The 
concerns were further aggravated by the linking of Kosovo’s case to the frozen conflicts 
in the post-Soviet space. As the New Member States have also been interested in 
resolving the frozen conflicts, they were careful to avoid such assertions.   
Kosovo has long created divisions and controversies within the EU as a whole. In 1999, 
after a NATO operation, care of Kosovo was entrusted to the international community 
and increasingly to the European Union. The EU followed its usual tactic in the Balkans, 
to put aside the problem and hope that a solution will present itself. After a decade, in 
2008, when the issue of Kosovo was “unfrozen”, the EU countries faced tough choices.  
One might think that the US, which has been the main proponent of Kosovo’s 
independence, would have used its clout to shift the New Member States decisions in 
the desired direction. Though there was no direct US pressure to do so, Washington’s 
stance was taken very seriously in the capitals of the New Member States, but other 
concerns trumped this factor and even the very pro-Atlantic President Basescu of 
Romania has been very much against the recognition of Kosovo.  
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Estonia has been a firm supporter of Kosovo, and recognised quickly. Hungary and 
Bulgaria have been apprehensive of harming their good relations with immediate 
neighbour Serbia. They did finally recognise Kosovo, as in the case of Bulgaria the 
regional stability consideration (fear of instability spill-over to Macedonia) and need for 
Western solidarity trumped other considerations.  
Romania and Slovakia, because of domestic political and foreign policy reasons, oppose 
the recognition of Kosovo to this day. Both countries had concerns of spill-over effects 
vis-à-vis their minorities as well as concerns about harming relations with their 
traditional ally Serbia. Their reservations are deeply entrenched and are unlikely to be 
changed any time soon, but this may be contradicted in the longer term when Kosovo 
begins to seek accession into the EU.  
Despite the differences, none of the countries opposed or questioned the EU’s role in 
Kosovo. On the contrary, they supported greater EU involvement as the only way to 
help stabilise Kosovo.  
A tall order: deciding on Turkey’s accession 
The New Member States in general show a high level of solidarity for the candidates and 
potential candidates. There is also the paradox of requesting fast accession of current 
candidates to open the way for another round of enlargement. One might also suspect 
the US support to Turkey’s bid might find fertile ground in the pro-Atlantic new 
members. But none of these arguments applies in the case of Turkey. While there are 
countries that indeed favour quick membership for Turkey, many of them are 
ambivalent towards short and medium-term membership prospects or even deliberate 
open-ended negotiations.  
There are at two problems with these attitudes. First, Turkey has repeated over and 
over again that its goal is membership and other options are not even on the table for 
deliberation. The second problem is that Turkey feels hurt by the fast track membership 
of the post-Communist states, while a country that has long been part of the West as a 
NATO member was sidelined in the EU accession process. Even worse, Turkey considers 
the chastising of its democracy deficits or other shortcomings by former Soviet satellites 
as adding insult to injury (as Suat Kiniklioglu argued years ago).   
 Estonia’s government is arguably the most supportive to Turkey’s membership, 
followed by Romania and Hungary. Latvia and the Czech Republic can also be 
considered supporters above the average level. But even these countries do not 
describe themselves as “drivers” for Turkey’s membership and would not actively 
oppose a blockade on negotiations. Romania’s position is even more situational, as it 
relates Turkish membership to the prospects of building the Nabucco gas pipeline 
(which Turkey threatens to torpedo if negotiations derail).  
 Slovenia, Slovakia and 
Bulgaria have a midway 
position, supporting 
negotiations and the 
desired goal of 
membership. But both 
Bulgaria and Slovakia have 
indicated they might 
support a more scrupulous 
negotiation process. The 
Slovak parliament has 
previously angered Turkey 
by recognising the 
Armenian genocide in 2004. 
Slovakia has also supported the blockade on negotiations because of the row over the 
Ankara protocol, when Turkey in practice denied recognition of Cyprus, already an EU 
Member State. Bulgaria’s case is different and ambivalence is prevailing. It has never 
said yes or no to Turkey’s bid. Bulgaria is a direct neighbour of Turkey and they are 
major partners. Turkish influence  
on the economy as well as in politics through the Turkish minority party pushes Bulgaria 
into the “yes” camp. But historic sensitivities and current concerns about potential 
Turkish domination among Bulgaria’s political elite and population are pulling it in the 
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other direction. At the end of the day, depending more on domestic political 
developments rather than on other considerations, Bulgaria is prone to supporting a 
longer and more scrupulous negotiation process.  
EU debates often link Turkey and Ukraine in possible membership scenarios — weighing 
preferences for their similar strategic importance and size. Both Lithuania and Poland 
have placed support to Turkey in the context of Ukraine’s possible membership. While 
they have an overall positive attitude to Turkey’s membership, their preference for Kiev 
might impede Ankara if a choice had to be made, as Vilnius and Warsaw state that 
delays in Turkish negotiations should not infringe on Ukraine’s progress. Poland is also 
prone to cool down its support for Turkey or even hold up the process for at least two 
reasons. Poland increasingly realises, first, that Turkey’s size might drain the EU budget 
from the New Member States and second, that the sheer voting power of Turkey might 
create complications for Poland itself.  
Of the New Member 
States, only Lithuania 
would not reject an open-
ended negotiations with 
Turkey that might end up 
in “strategic partnership” 
or another similar option 
(privileged partnership or 
special partnership), but 
even the stance of official 
Vilnius is in support to 
Turkey’s negotiation 
process and membership.  
Public opinion in the New 
Member States seem, 
generally, to coincide with 
the political positions. 
Romania’s and Hungary’s 
high level of support is reflected in majority approval, with Romanians having the least 
negative opinion. Only Estonia’s public fails to follow the politicians’ lead and registers 
higher disapproval levels than support. Bulgaria’s public opinion reflects the 
ambivalence — support and disapproval are in equal measure. On the balance, the New 
Member State citizens who do not support membership of Turkey currently outweigh 
those who support it.  
Think big: shaping the Eastern neighbourhood policy 
All the New Member States, except Slovenia, are located at the eastern fringes of the 
European Union and have high stakes in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood policies. Their 
positions set out three trends outlining large-scale shifts in the design of the EU’s policy 
making.  
In the first place, there are the turf battles between the “Southern” and “Eastern” flanks 
within the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the New Member States are trying to 
swing attention and resources towards their part of the world. Slovenia is the only 
country with more substantial interests and participation in the southern, Mediterranean 
dimension. Second, there is a growing divergence within the “East” camp, projected in 
the making of specific policies. This is the division between the Black Sea Synergy and 
the new Eastern Partnership, outlining different visions of how business in the 
neighbourhood should be conducted.  
Third, there is the coupling of enlargement and neighbourhood policies, where several 
New Member States envisage the next wave of enlargement involving current 
neighbourhood countries. One of Lithuania’s expectations is that the new Eastern 
Partnership will emulate the intensity and instruments of relations between the EU and 
the Western Balkans. As the Eastern dimension of Neighbourhood Policy will transform 
into an enlargement policy, it is expected that a membership perspective will be 
provided to Eastern neighbours even in the short term (Latvia wants this enshrined in 
the enhanced cooperation agreement).  
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Tipping the balance of the policy frameworks: Partnership vs. Synergy  
The Eastern Partnership, previously known as the Polish–Swedish initiative (after the 
main authors), is currently the dominant policy towards the Eastern neighbours. It 
illustrates a substantial shift in the approach of the EU, with a more genuine focus and 
engagement. More importantly, it is well received by the neighbourhood countries, 
which view it as a fresh departure from the previous patchy and indecisive 
neighbourhood approach. The Eastern Partnership puts the so-called Black Sea Synergy 
announced in April 2007 in the backseat. Unlike the Synergy, the partnership does not 
include the regional superpowers of Russia and Turkey, but focuses on furthering 
relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus when the 
relations normalise enough. According to some, this is a setback, but to most of the 
new members and the neighbourhood countries this is an asset as it removes the great 
powers’ play and influence to open the way for equal treatment and partnership. In a 
way, through the Eastern Partnership, the ENP is returning to its roots by focusing only 
on countries within the neighbourhood: both Russia and Turkey have their own special 
level of relations with the EU, and scoff at being treated on par with the Eastern 
neighbours.  
In February 2009, the EC issued a reconciliatory statement that the Eastern Partnership 
and the Black Sea Synergy should be developed in parallel, but it was more of a gesture 
— mostly towards Bulgaria, which still insists that investing in the Black Sea Synergy is 
worth doing. The real reconciliation between the two policies is that the Eastern 
Partnership is the “real thing”, while the Synergy retains the character of a more low 
key, technical cooperation.  
The good news for the neighbours is that as Sweden will take over from the Czech 
Republic in the 2009 rotating presidency, the EU will be on the same page for a whole 
year before moving back to the Mediterranean with the Spanish presidency in the first 
half of 2010.  
Partner Preferences in the Eastern neighbourhood   
Ukraine and Georgia are the preferred partners within the Neighbourhood Policy, and it 
is due as to the geopolitical or other significance attached to these states as well as to 
the reciprocal aspiration and commitment of those states for closer ties with the EU. 
They have invested more efforts in reforms and cultivating relations with the EU 
partners. 
Ukraine is undoubtedly a pivotal state in the East and, as Brzezinski claimed in his 
Grand Chessboard, the country is essential for overall European stability. All New 
Member States support enhanced cooperation with Kiev and the staunchest advocates 
of Ukraine see the special approach within the Neighbourhood Policy as only a precursor 
and preparation for the “real thing” — EU membership.  
Georgia receives a very high level of solidarity and support — especially after the 
August War of 2008, which dismembered the country and shattered its society, with 
political, developmental and post-conflict reconstruction assistance flowing into the 
country. Georgia is not envisioned in a membership prospect soon, as it is in a quite 
different geopolitical and security context and farther away from the EU borders. 
Moldova also receives a high level of support and not only from “kinship”-related 
Romania, but also from other countries — more assertively by the Baltics. There is 
currently a change of course towards Belarus, trying to engage and not isolate 
Lukashenko’s regime. The “Policy Drivers” among the New Member States are at the 
helm of this charm offensive. The other South Caucasus republics — Armenia and 
Azerbaijan — also have very good friends and are encouraged to join, despite the fact 
that they have not yet made up their minds on their strategic orientation. 
Meet the Policy Drivers in the Eastern neighbourhood  
Poland and the three Baltic republics are probably the staunchest supporters of the 
neighbourhood countries and the Polish–Swedish initiative is a vivid testimony to that. 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic follow suit very closely and Romania, through its 
interest in Moldova, joins the group too. Lithuania overtly supports the future 
transformation of the ENP into an enlargement policy per se. In fact, all these countries 
favour elements from enlargement mechanisms applied in the neighbourhood policies 
so that they may serve as a preparation for membership negotiations. The Czech 
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Republic will use its presidency of the EU to officially launch the Eastern Partnership and 
organise accompanying activities intended to push substance into the formal events. 
Romania, too, has been very active as an engine for Black Sea cooperation but has so 
far contained its interest mostly to helping out Moldova.  
The New Member States see closer relations with the neighbours as a long-term 
investment. This means that they are not deterred by lack of reciprocity — as in the 
case of Romania’s enthusiasm despite the cold shoulder (which actually escalated to a 
cold war in the spring of 2009) from Moldova’s President Voronin, the political turmoil in 
Ukraine, or the often harsh 
critiques from Georgian 
President Saakashvili for the 
failures of the EU to respond 
adequately to his calls for 
help. The EU has even 
decided it’s better to co-opt 
authoritarian Lukashenko 
than to isolate his regime.  
Bulgaria and Hungary are 
shying away from the 
general zeal for assertive 
neighbourhood policies. Still, 
Hungary shows preferences 
for Ukraine as a direct 
neighbour and for Moldova, 
which is considered close 
enough to the EU (with possible long-term membership options). Bulgaria has found a 
niche in the Black Sea cooperation and previously enjoyed closer relations with the 
South Caucasus countries. Now it wants to breathe new life into the Black Sea Synergy.  
The EU “army”: a minimalist approach 
While the New Member States never tire of supporting a “one voice” European Union 
with a stronger role in the world, their enthusiasm for an “armed wing” of EU’s foreign 
policy seems to be fading away. There may to be at least three fairly good reasons for 
this. For the sake of the New Member States, however, none of them seems to 
contradict in principle their otherwise high level of trust in the EU as such.  
Probably the most outstanding factor is the competition between NATO and EU as 
“military powers”, and NATO seems to be winning. All New Member States at some 
point say that “there should be no competition between NATO and the fledging EU 
defence capabilities”. But there is certainly “NATO first” thinking in the New Member 
States. The reasons for making this choice are more complex than the proverbial pro-
Atlantic vs. pro-European loyalties as a hanging shadow of Mr. Rumsfeld’s New Europe.  
A group of New Member States — Poland and the three Baltic states — take security 
very seriously. They do think that (a) for the time being only NATO has the capability to 
protect them and (b) the transatlantic link (that is, the US presence) is indispensable. 
These countries also seem to look down on EU’s defence capabilities — as Estonia does 
— as too dependent on Russia (for strategic lift), which would automatically exclude 
useful application of the “defence instrument” in regions where Russia would oppose it.  
 
Third, the New Member 
States have very limited 
military capabilities and 
even current commitments 
(whether within NATO, or 
within the EU, or on bilateral bases) overstretch their forces. They do not see a good 
reason for further duplication of resources. In fact, this is also the case with far richer 
and bigger EU members.  
The fourth reason is that the EU as such has dragged its feet in shaping the defence 
policy and does not have much to offer. A fourth, though less exposed reason is that 
while the ESDP is driven by the big Member States in some form of enhanced 
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cooperation, the small New Member States will feel pushed aside and reluctant to 
cooperate.  
This ambivalence does not mean that the New Member States are hostile to the security 
and defence policy. They take part in the ESDP missions and battle groups. Poland is a 
the only new member to be part of the Eurocorps, with  pledge also from Romania.  
The “EU army” gathers support from even unexpected sources as Bulgaria’s nationalist 
Ataka party (otherwise Eurosceptic), which chastised the EU for failing to develop a 
robust defence policy. 
The chances for a New Member State to “kill” an ESDP initiative are slim. It is not 
excluded if some ESDP proposal is seen as disrupting the NATO link (e.g. as suggested 
in Latvia’s case). But provided that even France, which has been the main ESDP 
proponent, has fully returned to NATO, the North Atlantic alliance is unlikely to be 
challenged any time soon.  
We’ll always have D.C.: the new members and the transatlantic link  
There is no “New Europe” in the sense that Donald Rumsfeld branded it — the New 
Member States do not provide blindfolded support to everything the US does. In fact, 
this report argues that if the New Member States of the EU can be defined as a “group”, 
there are more markers to delineate the  than the simple division of “Eurocentrist” vs. 
“Atlanticist” stances. And the “groups” of course comes in diverse configurations 
depending on the markers.  
Since the start of the EU accession process, Brussels became the focal point of the CEE. 
And the deeper the new members were engulfed in EU affairs, the less intense the 
relations with Washington seemed. But despite the relative decrease in the intensity of 
relations, the New Member States retain an extremely strong transatlantic link. 
Washington is an important factor and partner for them and this is not likely to change 
soon.  
There are two factors at work here. The first one was that the new members — former 
Communist countries — have always seen the “West” mostly as a bloc. European–
American rows made them uneasy, and they have always tried to avoid a choice 
between Europe and America. Moreover, for them, “NATO” (under US lead) and “EU” 
accession were coupled as the inseparable twin projects of their transition paradigm. 
NATO’s accession was faster and it first initiated the former Communist states back into 
the “West”.  
The second factor is that the New Member States have made up their minds on the 
“division of responsibilities”. The US has a limited but decisive role. The US — both 
through NATO and on a bilateral basis — is the primary partner or the key factor in 
defence, security, and often in foreign and energy policies. The central European states, 
including the three Baltic states, Poland and Romania explicitly view the United States 
as their security guarantor. The US has bases (officially dubbed “joint military 
installations”) in Bulgaria and Romania under special defence cooperation agreements. 
The plans for the missile defence shield elements in Poland and the Czech Republic may 
not soon materialize, but the underlying policy is for deeper engagement. In the foreign 
policy domain, US policy has been crucial exactly in the areas of foreign policy interest 
of the New Member States — the Balkans, the Black Sea area, the rest of the Eastern 
neighbours, and Russia.  
There are certainly oscillations in the political and public attitudes towards the US, 
juxtaposing “Eurocentrist vs. Atlanticist” political camps. And as things cannot be that 
simple, there is often the too-complex “Russia” factor as a third party in the equation.   
But by and large, this part of Europe is quite “Atlanticist”. And though most of the new 
members would be more in the “Policy Taker” than “Driver” category, they will continue 
to insist on a strong transatlantic link between the EU and the US, avoiding the double-
bind question, “who do you like more?” To borrow from Robert Kagan’s claim, the new 
members find it exhausting to commute the long distance between “Venus” and “Mars”.   
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On the other side of the fence: policies in the area of freedom, security and 
justice 
Ranking priorities and measuring activity  
The New Member States have three sets of policies within the freedom, justice and 
security domain. The highest priority is given to protection of external borders and the 
Schengen agreements. The second priority set is the cooperation on EU level in the 
fight against organised and transborder crime. The third area concerns asylum and 
migration policies.  
The new members seem to be relatively passive on freedom, security and justice 
policies. They are mostly “Policy Takers” in the classification of this report, with the 
notable exception of the Czech Republic. Prague, more often than not, has been quite 
inquisitive about proposals in the area and is a likely “Policy Killer”.  
There may be an explanation for this overall “Policy Taker” approach in that the new 
members do not have high stakes in many of these issues, e.g. the asylum or migration 
issues. But the more plausible explanation may be about the character of these policies. 
They involve quite complex, transborder issues that often demand an EU-wide response 
and intricate legal issues. The new members were also especially hard pressed during 
the accession period on policies within Justice and Home Affairs. The pressure continued 
to fulfil stringent requirements for entering the Schengen zone — and the demands are 
here to stay. In fulfilling these requirements (i.e. external border protection, visa 
related policies) the new member cannot do without special assistance from the EU as a 
whole. The combination of the complexity of issues, the need for extra EU assistance 
and the extraordinary level of  
 
demand have resulted in the new members being more compliant with the common 
European solutions (i.e. “Policy Takers”).  
What else matters? 
The freedom, security and justice policies are perceived by the new members primarily 
in security terms — as border protection, fighting organised crime, illegal migration, 
smuggling and trafficking take precedence.  
But they are well connected and employed in other policy areas. Visa regimes and 
border crossings may be leverages in foreign policy for regulating relations and serve 
either as incentives for reform (Western Balkans and the Eastern neighbourhood 
countries) or as punishment (the Lukashenko regime in Belarus).  
These policies are also increasingly used to regulate inflowing migration, i.e. through 
national “Green Card” policies or “mobility partnerships” to attract skilled migrants.  
It’s also a matter of trust 
The policies within the area of freedom, security and justice may be quite sensitive as 
they affect such closely guarded domains as the national legislative systems or 
intelligence and law enforcement. Thus, policies in this area also require, among other  
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 things, an exceptional level of trust among EU Member States. And all new members 
have been under extreme pressure by West Europeans to deliver. Fighting illegal 
migration, transborder and organised crime needs a coordinated EU-wide or regional 
approach, and also involves a high level of confidence among partners. In order to lift 
internal barriers — to the extent Schengen does — the states in the interior have to 
trust that the countries on the external borders are doing their job properly. Eight of the 
New Member States just recently joined the Schengen zone as full members: once part 
of an inner club within the EU, they are intent first of all on fulfilling the expectations of 
their Western counterparts as reliable partners. Bulgaria and Romania work hard to 
meet Schengen’s daunting criteria.  
Security and solidarity dilemmas: Schengen and the external borders 
The New Member States have two priorities within the Schengen and external borders 
protection policies. But the priorities may be conflicting with 
each other and the new members are tightly pressed to keep a 
balance between often diverging commitments and interests. 
This tension is a result of the obligations they have within the 
EU’s JHA policies and their foreign policy interests for good 
neighbourly relations.  
As the new members are all at the periphery of the EU, their 
first priority is to make the EU borders safe and impenetrable. 
But at the same time, they all want a more favourable visa and 
facilitated border-crossing regime with their non-EU neighbours. 
In the first case, they are under strains to follow their 
commitment to the EU and fulfil the expectations of their 
Western counterparts. In the second case, they have a 
multitude of fairly good reasons for that: practical purposes to 
facilitate trade and economy; for solidarity reasons, as they 
were in similar positions not too long ago; and as part of the 
general support to the neighbours for much closer relations with 
the EU.  
Within the broader EU framework on border protection, the New Member States are 
seeking a balance between the “Southern dimension” and the “Eastern and Balkan 
dimension”, as the latter concerns directly the New Member States.  
Choosing policy options 
All the new members have external EU borders, except for the Czech Republic but 
which  has a stake in these policies too. But the choice of policies depends on the 
particular challenge the guarding of these borders represents. There are diverse 
flashpoints: the southern border and the Western Balkans, the north-eastern and 
eastern borders (with the special case of Kaliningrad), the maritime borders with the 
Black Sea in the south and the Baltic Sea in the north.  
Thus the countries that have longer borders demonstrate more enthusiasm for common 
measures or measures that will help their national efforts. For example, Hungary, which 
soon expects to remain with only two short strips of external borders, is more reluctant 
about costly measures. Landlocked countries are much less inclined to support the new 
EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System), which will boost the surveillance of 
the maritime borders.   
There is generally very strong support for Frontex — the European border management 
agency — and the intention to provide it with more powers and funding (the Czech 
Republic is the sceptic on this issue).   
Asylum and immigration: a showcase and test for solidarity  
The New Member States have medium to low concern about migration and even less for 
asylum issues, as compared to the rest of the EU. The New Member States are 
supportive to the enveloping asylum policies mostly for solidarity reasons — they 
understand the concerns of Member States most affected by asylum and migration 
issues and want to show some team spirit. The New Member States are only marginally 
affected by these phenomena now, despite expectations that they would themselves 
turn from a source of migration to countries of destination. But currently they are 
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mostly transit routes for asylum seekers or illegal migrants, 
travelling to more affluent countries.  
 Public opinion is not concerned about asylum seekers and asylum 
policy either. The figures are well below the average EU levels.  
But while supportive, the New Member States may turn into “Policy 
Killers” if proposed measures run against their interests. The 
support is for more harmonisation, but it stops short there. Their 
position on the new Pact on Asylum and Migration, offered by the 
French Presidency in 2008, has indicated high support overall, but 
also relief that the Pact offers political guidelines for the EU and not 
mandatory prescriptions for the governments.  
A common objection is that imposing a standard treatment of 
asylum seekers and migrants across the EU may strain the 
resources of the host countries. Raising minimal standards,  
without regard to the socio-economic development of the host 
states, may result in a better treatment of foreign nationals than of 
the New Member States’ own citizens. In the EU context, this would mean better 
conditions for third-country nationals than for fellow EU citizens from new members. 
The frustration comes most of all before the backdrop of the imposed transition periods 
for the New Member States — with the infamous backlash against the “Polish plumber” 
— causing a hostile response to the idea of an EU-wide “Blue Card” for third-country 
nationals that might discriminate against those from new members.  
Deliberating to attract migrants  
But the other side of the migration policy coin is that the new members have started to 
deliberate managed migration to attract skilled migrants into their own countries. The 
combination of high economic growth and outward migration has left many new 
members’ labour markets depleted. Thus, many New Member States have concentrated 
on managed migration to attract third-country nationals. The logical choice was to offer 
opportunities to neighbouring states through the so-called “circular migration” and 
related “mobility partnerships” and even their own “Green Card” programmes, directed 
especially at the Eastern neighbourhood countries. There is certainly a practical element 
in this, attracting quality personnel, but there is also a policy element for furthering 
relations with close neighbours. The economic crisis might reverse or temporarily halt 
these measures, but with the mechanisms in place they would be restarted as soon as 
the economy recovers.  
Fighting transborder and organised crime  
 Fighting transborder and organised crime is a high priority for the 
New Member States, not least because of initial expectations that 
enlargement would infuse higher crime levels into the EU. As 
organised crime often has a transborder character, fighting it 
depends on common and coordinated approaches across the EU.  
These demands have translated into greater support to specialised 
institutions and policies. The New Member States are very 
supportive of the two organisations, Europol and Eurojust. Europol 
received a high level of support from the New Member States and 
it was during the Slovene presidency that Europol was transformed 
into an EU agency. These attitudes also entail support for 
legislative measures such as harmonisation of serious aspects of 
cross-border crime.  
They are also enthusiastic about the Prüm convention on 
“deepening transfrontier cooperation, amongst others in view of 
combating terrorism, transfrontier crime, and illegal migration”. 
The new members have also been inclined to introduce the QMV 
and “communitarisation” of the third pillar as a contingency plan to 
boost Justice and Home Affairs should the Lisbon Treaty fail. 
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Local specifics and contributions 
There are two “local” contributions to the area of freedom, security and justice, which 
deserve to be registered here, despite that they are of very different character and 
order.  
The first one is the case of Bulgaria and Romania being placed under special 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanisms after accession, which monitor and assess 
their progress in judicial reform and fighting corruption and organised crime. The 
monitoring mechanism is carried out by the EC and there is the possibility of imposing a 
safeguard clause as a last resort in case of non-delivery.  
In another, completely different “contribution” to freedom, security and justice policies, 
a host of new members (the Baltic countries and the Czech Republic in the lead) want 
an official recognition that the crimes of the Stalinist and totalitarian regimes can be 
equated to the gravity of Nazi crimes. They have proposed it as part of the Council 
Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia. But the EU as a whole is 
reluctant to delve into the complex ethical debate, as it sparks domestic and foreign 
policy issues, involving Russia.  
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Visions of Europe: deciding on the institutional issues 
A future encyclopaedia entry to the Lisbon Treaty should have the photographs of the 
Kaczynski brothers and Mr. Václav Klaus next to it. The old Member States — France, 
the Netherlands and Ireland — may have made a public display in rejecting the EU’s 
institutional progress, but the new members —Poland and the Czech Republic — have 
put a more personal face to it as their leaders led the offensive first on the 
Constitutional Treaty and then on the Lisbon Treaty.  
However, such vehement opposition is an exception rather than the rule among the 
New Member States. Like most neophytes, the New Member States want to prove that 
they are better Europeans than the old Member States by demonstrating more zeal in 
things European. In fact, most countries rushed to ratify both proposed treaties at 
record speeds — Hungary did so even before having translated the Lisbon Treaty into 
the Hungarian language. There have been afterthoughts that the ratification process 
could have been used as a bargaining tool, for example some voices in Bulgaria and 
Lithuania wanting to leverage it against reopening nuclear reactors, but that never 
materialised. The new members avoided referendums as any delay or unwanted results 
(a rejection would be presumably for domestic reasons) might have tarnished their 
image as good Europeans. The levels of enthusiasm for the European Union that 
politicians and the public alike have demonstrated have remained high through the 
years despite minor fluctuations.  
Despite the fact that no country stands out as a particular Policy Driver or Killer (except 
for Poland and the Czech Republic), institutional issues are undoubtedly of key 
importance to the new members.  
Issue  Preference 
President of the 
European Council 
  X  Preferably low key and largely symbolic role, so that it 
does not overshadow the rotating presidencies and 
impose the will of the big states.  
 As he is considered to be from a big Member State, 
even Tony Blair may not stand a chance for receiving 
support.  
Rotating presidency  √  Its stature should be retained. 
High Representative   √  More acceptable than the President. Preferably a new 
member representative should be appointed.  
 The High Representative should hold on to his EC-hat 
more.  
External Action Service 
(EAS) 
√  Although not particularly liked by national 
administrations as a competitor, the EAS is very 
welcome as it would multiply the influence and 
representation of smaller states.  
 Some new members insist on a quota to guarantee 
greater representation (Hungary does not want it for 
the same reasons).  
 There should be some sort of regional specialisation, so 
that the New Member States cover regions/issues of 
their national interests.  
 The EAS should be on the common budget. 
European Commission  √  One country — one commissioner. Quite happy with the 
arrangement gained by Ireland during the French 
Presidency.  
European Parliament   √  The more for the new members the better. That is why 
the Lisbon Treaty is preferred.  
Qualified Majority Voting 
(QMV) 
  √  Acceptable, as long as it does not apply in areas of 
special interest to the new members, such as taxation.  
Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 
  √  Accepted by all, except for Poland, which gained an 
opt-out, and the Czech Republic with a protocol as a 
reservation. 
One-speed EU   √  Means less enthusiasm for enhanced cooperation 
projects.  
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SMALL BIG 
NEW OLD 
What do they really want? Paradoxes of behaviour 
The New Member States had three requirements for the Lisbon Treaty: 
 The Lisbon Treaty should be ratified by all Member States and in force as 
soon as possible. 
 No re-negotiation or revisions of the Treaty during the ratification should be 
allowed. 
 Given the opportunity, the new members would immediately scrap the 
Treaty and re-write key provisions.  
There is an apparent paradox between the first two and the third claim that demands 
an explanation.  
The  reason is that the New Member States strongly support what the Lisbon Treaty 
stands for, but at the same time they are concerned that some of the novelties in the 
Treaty would infringe on their interests, and that a hasty revision may bring in other 
less-beneficial provisions inserted through the backdoor without consultations. 
The Lisbon Treaty, as a successor of the Constitutional Treaty, is meant to introduce 
very serious institutional changes in the EU that will allow it to function more 
effectively: the institutions will be redesigned for more members, thus providing for 
further enlargements; the EU role in the world will be consolidated; and hopefully the 
democratic deficit will also be addressed.  
The New Member States are very much in favour of all these — they want a more 
effective Union, they want to see their role in the world multiplied through the EU 
common institutions, they want enlargement to continue as this is the centrepiece of 
their foreign policies. Their understanding is that Lisbon may not be the best, but it is 
the most feasible course of action in order to allow the EU to progress further after the 
train crash of the Constitutional Treaty. 
A delay in introducing Lisbon will mean less-favourable treatment as provided for under 
the Nice Treaty, for example, fewer seats at the European Parliament.  
A quick ratification would prevent sudden and undesired renegotiation of the Treaty. 
The current shape of the Treaty was attained after tiresome negotiations and carefully 
crafted bargains. The new members are quite concerned that a hasty revision will allow 
bigger and more influential states to introduce undesirable changes.  
But at the same time the New Member States remain apprehensive about some of the 
provisions in the Lisbon Treaty that they think do not best serve their interests.  
The outcome of the institutional debates in the European Union can significantly 
increase or decrease the status of the new members within the EU — either elevated as 
normal peers or relegated to a second tier position within the institutions and the 
decision making of the EU. As they are already lagging behind on an array of criteria 
such as the “European level” of economic and social development, they are careful not 
to lose leverages to advance their agenda.  
The President, High Representative and the External Action Service are the first on the 
watch list as having the potential to discriminate against the new members. While the 
new members accept the Treaty as it is, they will seek opportunities to shape these 
institutions to their liking only after the Treaty has been ratified. 
Double disadvantage: the root of the problem and coalition patters 
 
The New Member States consider that they are at a 
double disadvantage — once as “new” and then as 
“small” member states. This anxiety may explain 
their preferences and strategies in shaping the 
institutional setup of the EU. Poland is an exception 
with a fulsome 29 votes in the Council, 50 MEPs and 
a place in the “G6” — the group of the biggest EU 
members. But even Poland, which is in a league of 
its own, shares many of the new members’ interests. 
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 The new members’ concern is that the big Member States may 
easily use their clout — by outvoting or cutting separate deals — 
to undermine the interests of the small Member States. In a 
similar vein they think that as new members they are 
underrepresented in the common institutions and do not have 
the same institutional knowledge and capacity for influence.   
Public opinion supports the argument of the New Member States 
feeling small and in relative deprivation. Except for Slovakia and 
Slovenia, the citizens of the other countries consider that the 
interests of their states are not well respected in the EU.  
Those two concerns help shape coalitions patterns along two 
sides of the barricade: “new” vs. “old” and “small/medium” vs. 
“big” countries.  
 
 
Damage control: the power of the institutional and national interest 
The perceived double disadvantage results in the new members designing strategies to 
control the possible damages and maximise the benefits of the Lisbon Treaty. This 
translates into two inter-related strategies — balancing between the intergovernmental 
and supranational approaches in the EU, and seeking to influence the functioning of a 
position or an agency. This influence can be both in the form of fiddling the “job 
descriptions” of the new positions in the EU and having a say over the appointments of 
a concrete person.  They hardly hope to prevail, but want to set sort of system of 
checks and balances in place to avoid total domination.  
For example, the High Representative, while serving as the “one voice” of the EU, 
should ideally reflect the positions of all member states. But the new members would 
prefer the High Representative to be more “EC-centric” — i.e. sticking closer to the role 
as Vice-President of the Commission. This would presumably move him/her away from 
any particular Member State position and closer to a common ground position. Thus, 
the concern of being sidelined by the bigger and more influential states drives the New 
Member States into embracing the Commission as their ally as it represents “higher”, 
common European interest as opposed to the narrow national interests. In fact, a 
recent case in point was the row over protectionist measures touted by President 
Sarkozy, where new members looked upon the Commission as guardian of the internal 
market freedoms.  
Regarding the specific appointment, existing opinion is that the President would 
certainly come from a big Member State, but a representative of a New Member State 
may have a chance as a High Representative. As registered in the country reports, even 
Tony Blair, otherwise highly popular among the new members, would not have a chance 
for their support.  
But the support for the Commission and the supranational principle is used only 
selectively as the new members are definitely not comfortable with the provisions that 
will diminish the role of the Member States. While considering the new positions of 
President of the EU and High Representative essential, the new members are concerned 
that these new positions may literally steal the show from the rotating presidencies. 
For many of the small countries this will not only deprive them of opportunities to 
promote their policy agenda but will also take away a valuable prestige opportunity — 
their 15 minutes of glory on the international and domestic scene. The future President 
of the European Council is a particularly controversial position. According to the new 
members it would endanger both their rotating presidencies and serve mostly as the 
voice of the big Member States. The preferred solution: the position should be low-
profile and with limited competencies. Even Poland, which is in the big states club, has 
been concerned about the future President of the Council, especially when Poland’s 
Presidency of the EU is nearing in 2011 and it worries that there is too little time to 
clearly divide roles between the permanent and rotating presidencies.   
The functioning of the External Action Service (EAS) is supported by all new members 
and is probably the least questioned innovation. The reasoning is that it will help the 
Are the interests of your 
country well respected in 
the EU? EB69, 2008 
Slovakia 57 
Slovenia 56 
EU 27 46 
Estonia 46 
Poland 44 
Lithuania 40 
Romania 40 
Hungary 37 
Czech Republic 36 
Bulgaria 32 
Latvia 22 
Comparative Policy Report  
www.eupi.eu 
45
small and new to multiply their diplomatic representation and international weight. But 
it too brings a bone of contention. As the EAS is a “common property” between the 
Member States and the EU institutions, the new members insist on greater 
representation of the Member States. Some of them would like to see an official or 
unofficial quota (Hungary does not want it as it thinks it can fill more positions than 
provided by a quota) as well as appointments that correspond to their foreign policy 
interests. But the EAS should be covered fully by the EU budget.   
Representation in the European Commission is seen as another opportunity for prestige 
and advancing the agenda of the Member States. Despite the fact that the 
commissioners are considered supra-national and in practice may have poor relations 
with their national governments for political or other reasons, the Member States still 
like to think of them as representatives of their countries and defenders of their 
interests within the EC. The New Member States accepted, but were never happy with, 
the initial Lisbon Treaty arrangements that decreased the number of commissioners.  
“One country — one commissioner” is the preferred formula, now back in circulation 
after the December 2008 bargain with Ireland over accepting the Lisbon Treaty. But the 
relative weight of the portfolio also matters, demonstrated by Romania’s stance with 
just a “multi-linguist” commissioner and its vows to gain the “agriculture seat” in the 
2009 Commission.  
“One-speed Europe” only is the other major preference as the New Member States are 
all alarmed by any hints at “multi-speed” Europe. This may translate into less support 
for or even discouragement of any attempts at enhanced cooperation projects. They 
feel that such projects may exclude them because of their weaker capacity, and they 
themselves would hardly start such an enterprise.  
Bringing down the house: the Polish and Czech cases  
Poland and the Czech Republic have made a name for themselves through their unruly 
behaviour towards the EU’s institutional development plans. Warsaw has been more 
assertive as because of its sheer weight as well as because domestic political 
developments combined the influence of the President and the Prime Minister (the 
brothers Kaczynski) amid weak opposition. Prague has mainly President Klaus and the 
Eurosceptic wing of the ruling Civic Democratic Party of Prime Minister Topolánek.  
In contrast to smaller new members, Poland is less anxious that the new positions in 
the EU might overshadow Warsaw’s stature. With 27 votes in the Council — next to the 
29 of Germany, France, UK and Italy, and equal to Spain’s 27 — and with Polish names 
being thrown into debates on new high level appointments, it really feels comfortable 
that it will not be pushed aside.  
Even as it took time and efforts to convince Poland that the Lisbon Treaty should be 
based on the Constitution, Poland announced the red lines that it would not cross. First, 
there is the opt-out from the Charter on Fundamental Rights, thus joining the UK as the 
only two countries to avoid the charter. In fact, besides joining an exceptional group of 
opt-outs such as the UK, Denmark and Ireland, the victory is also notable for the CEE 
crowd as they were not allowed opt-out options at all during the accession negotiations. 
Then Poland defied the double majority rule, delaying it until 2014 with a clause that 
would practically enforce it no earlier than 2017. Poland also managed to introduce a 
provision in the Lisbon Treaty (the so-called Ioannina clause in a protocol to the Treaty) 
that would allow Member States to delay decisions of the Council taken by qualified 
majority voting, although the decisions are de facto taken and not blocked.  
As a matter of fact, Poland’s MEPs have even defied the European Parliament rules by 
setting up the “Klub Polski”, uniting the Polish MEPs. The usual European ways are that 
the Members of the European Parliament function along party and ideological lines, not 
national ones, which is reflected even in the formation of groups.  
President Klaus, who dislikes the EU and likes to show it, has been a major trouble-
maker for the Lisbon Treaty too. The Czech critiques are targeted at principles such as 
sovereignty pooling and public legitimacy of the Treaty as well as concrete institutional 
proposals. The Czech Republic managed to score several victories, among which 
Prague’s own innovation was the “either way flexibility or bidirectional competences 
transfer”. The proposal allows for transferring competences back from the community 
level to the Member States and was ultimately included as part of Declaration 18 to the 
Treaty. The Czechs also defied the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and despite not 
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getting an opt-out like the Poles, managed to include their declaration on the Charter, 
implying they can backpedal on the Charter provisions if they consider it necessary. 
Prague, like many other new members, was concerned about the QMV rule in taxation, 
but it was ultimately resolved to their benefit.   
And while most of the new members rushed to ratify the Lisbon Treaty, the Czech 
Republic, driven by President Klaus, has not done so to this day. Even if the shaky 
government in Prague manages to ratify the Treaty in parliament, the President 
declared he will not sign it until Ireland backs it in a referendum, thus making the Czech 
Republic the last in line. 
Bulgaria Bulgaria
Czech Republic Czech Republic
Estonia Estonia
Hungary Hungary
Lithuania Lithuania
Latvia Latvia
Poland Poland
Romania Romania
Slovakia Slovakia
Slovenia Slovenia
EU 27 EU 27
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Lithuania
Latvia
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
EU 27
National interests are respected in the EU Level of trust in the EU
  
The new members: troublemakers or defenders of the faith 
Despite the wariness of the New Member States of possible “dictates” by the big and old 
members, this does not lower their enthusiasm for the EU or their visions for a deeper 
Union, as the new members subscribe for a stronger, more consolidated Europe. The 
New Member States uphold policies that espouse a more “federalist” thinking.  Their 
citizens often trust Brussels more than the governments in their national capitals. 
Translated into concrete policy solutions, the EU would have a “one voice” policy, 
especially in foreign policy matters, elevating the weight of the EU on the international 
scene. Hence the support to solutions as the High Commissioner for Foreign and 
Security Policy, who will combine the roles of the current High Commissioner (Mr. 
Solana) and the Commissioner for External Relations (Ms. Ferrero-Waldner), as well as 
the External Action Service (as the “foreign ministry” for the EU).  
The frustration of having less impact on the EU’s decision-making process never takes 
on the form of a considerable backlash. In fact, public opinion, despite feeling their 
country’s interests are not well respected, registers very high levels of trust in the 
European Union. This is a solid base of legitimacy for the new members, which want 
“more of the EU”. At the end of the day, the new members are striving to be good 
Europeans, trying to bring balance to the system.  
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Reality check 
The previous sections revolved more around the assertion “what the new members can 
do for the EU, not asking what the EU can do for them”. So there is a need to cross the 
two perspectives, pitting more sharply the policy plans of the New Member States 
against the reality on the ground — the predominant trends, preferences, factors 
shaping policy decisions as within the EU as well as in the wider policy context. 
 In the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs and internal market, the 
New Member States have scored a victory on rejecting taxation thanks to 
the UK’s own position and massive interventions. There have been partial 
successes in removing the transition period on workers mobility due to the 
good will of fellow Member States. The advocacy efforts to do with all the 
transition periods amounted to failure and had to be scaled back. The new 
members have willingly supported (mostly as “Policy Takers”) other 
measures in the package. Some of them are lobbying to get a short cut to 
joining the Euro, but this is a bridge too far as the Euro zone members and 
the ECB are reluctant to change the rules. 
 Minority integration issues, except for a few countries, are perceived as 
strictly internal matters for which the EU has only indirect and supportive 
functions. Only Hungary and Romania pursue change at EU level. The 
others are not convinced this is the best course of action and the major 
players have turned out be non-governmental organisations.  
 In the energy and climate area, the new members, led by Poland, have 
managed to win big on greenhouse gas emissions. Several of them have 
joined a powerful coalition (with France and Germany) to fight back the 
unbundling rule of the 3rd liberalisation package, which had brought the 
current compromise solutions. They, like the rest of the European Union, 
have remained divided over practical measures to guarantee energy 
security and common external energy policy. They have remained divided, 
but not opposed, over whether other policies — such as regulators’ 
cooperation — should be implemented. The big questions of a common 
European policy are still works in progress; for example, a major 
international summit coming in December 2009 in Copenhagen will pave the 
way towards a post-Kyoto arrangement.   
 In the Common Agriculture Policy, the New Member States are on 
friendly ground, as they did not want a revolution but smaller 
improvements. As the reform is yet to be elaborated and put into practice, 
it is likely that they will score partial successes and partial losses in the 
bargaining process.  
 The enlargement and neighbourhood options are a tough call. Currently 
the situation on the ground looks bleak, and the members’ more 
enthusiastic statements look misplaced. When talking about reality on the 
ground it means in Brussels and EU capitals as well as in the candidate and 
Eastern neighbourhood countries. The two candidates’ negotiations (Croatia 
and Turkey) have stalled; Macedonia has candidate status for four years 
now, but no date for negotiations. The rest of the Western Balkans are still 
on the “potential candidate” list. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have serious 
political stability or sovereignty issues. In Brussels and the major capitals, 
there are serious apprehensions about enlargement and neighbourhood, 
reflected in the pretext on halted institutional reform of the EU (“absorption 
or integration” capacity) as well as genuine concern over meddling in the 
hot spots in the East.  
 Freedom, security and justice is where the majority of New Member 
States seem to be most willing to follow the lead of the rest and prove to 
the Western partners that they are reliable. Schengen, safeguarding the 
external borders, and related policies are the most important issues. As the 
New Member States are all at the external borders and need the EU’s 
approach, help and solidarity, they are more inclined to stick to 
communitarised approaches. Asylum and illegal migration are of much less 
concern to them than to countries of destination and the EU Mediterranean 
Comparative Policy Report  
www.eupi.eu 
48
countries, but they support common policies as long as this would not 
burden their budgets or create better conditions for migrants and asylum 
seekers than for their own citizens.  
 Institutional issues is an area where most of the New Member States are 
“crypto-dissidents”. The Czech Presidency, which was expected to be a role 
model in many respects for the performance of the New Member States, fell 
victim to domestic politics. And this varying success level actually made the 
case for a stronger president of the EU and minimising the role of rotating 
presidency. Reportedly, Tony Blair is again on the shortlist as the first 
president of the EU, to lead it with decisive hand, paradoxically   thanks to 
Czech President Klaus, who in fact sought just the opposite effect.  
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Wrapping up and looking ahead: three scenarios for the future 
There are three scenarios in this chapter. The first, “business as usual” is actually a 
“baseline” scenario, summing up findings and projecting developments primarily on 
the basis of the research in this study. As there is a strong institutional routine in EU 
decision making, developments within this scenario will certainly take place even if 
some parameters undergo change.    
Then there are two “Great Recession” crisis scenarios, which take the liberty to 
move the vantage point higher and farther, even with the risk of losing some details 
along the way. Both these scenarios take as a point of departure the global crisis 
beyond its immediate economic effects. The crisis is perceived as a “make or break” 
event for the EU as seen from a New Member State perspective. These projections are 
not based on the research methodology and were not planned initially. But as the new 
members are increasingly and more deeply affected by the crisis, their role as “agenda 
setters” in the EU will be influenced too. Hence, both crisis scenarios were outlined to 
offer food for though and invite further discussion.  
The first scenario is dubbed “De-EU-isation”, claiming that the new members’ agenda 
will drift apart from the EU. This is a doomsday scenario, but still possible. The second 
crisis scenario is more optimistic, but most of all it is a prescriptive scenario that 
recommends “A ‘New Deal’ for the EU”.   
“Business as usual”: the baseline scenario 
Five assertions about the dynamics of new members’ policy positions 
This scenario is based on already-identified positions and projections about probable 
behaviour of the New Member States. It focuses on their preferences of priority areas 
and expected dynamics in the short and medium term:  
 The Member States have proven to be agenda setters in the European 
Union in their own right. While they have capacity deficiencies and limited 
weight in EU decision making, a policy proposal, a veto or the critical mass 
of a coalition may significantly tip the balance of an EU policy.  
 The new members have currently concentrated their efforts in four policy 
areas: energy and climate, CAP and budget, internal market and Lisbon 
Strategy, and foreign policy — with a decent share of activity as Policy 
Drivers or Killers as opposed to a more passive position as Policy Takers; 
 In the short and medium term, the new members’ portfolio of interest will 
stay similar: energy and climate, CAP and budget, internal market and 
Lisbon Strategy, and foreign policy; freedom security and justice and 
institutional issues will rank high as more concrete solutions should be 
identified within these two areas.  
 The future promises more dynamic developments as the intensity of activity 
may grow considerably in the near future in all seven policy areas. This will 
include significant increases in freedom, security and justice and 
institutional issues. In the energy and climate policy area, which is anyway 
the champion among new members, the level of activity will exceed the 
more passive “Policy Taker” attitude. This is based most of all on the fact 
that the EU will be taking important decisions soon in these areas and the 
new members will have to make choices.  
 A lower level of activity may not necessarily mean a lower level of interest 
—institutional development garners a lot of attention but fewer things are 
considered targets for change (it is an area of “crypto”-Killers and Drivers, 
which are dormant now but will become active once the bargaining on 
appointments and job descriptions for the EU’s new positions and structures 
starts). But Member States remain reluctant to promote minority 
integration, despite its importance, to the level of EU policy.   
On the balance, the New Member States have been more in the “Policy Taker” category, 
than “Policy Killers” or “Policy Drivers”. The reasons may vary from country to country 
and from issue to issue. Part of the explanation is the “jetlag” syndrome and the 
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shortage of capacity. But it is often the case that the countries either lack stakes or do 
not believe they can make a difference by their position. There may be a need to 
strongly re-connect the EU agenda with national public and political agendas. This 
would be a two-way process of more assertiveness on behalf of the new members and 
more responsiveness from the EU.  
 
Two “Great Recession” crisis scenarios for the new members and the EU 
The global crisis as a make-or-break event 
The global economic crisis is shattering current realities, transforming the world order 
and shaping new global governance. Its critical impact on the EU unfolds by the 
moment, posing two critical questions: 
(a) how the Union will get through this; and  
(b)  what the EU will be like when the crisis is over.  
The crisis-effect scenarios are based on the premise that the new members will be 
affected as a group. The international press, institutions and pundits have resurrected 
the concept of “Eastern Europe” in the context of the crisis. The re-branding has 
sometimes been used indiscriminately to include countries from Slovenia and Estonia as 
far as Ukraine or even Turkey. This was often to the dismay of the new EU members, 
which has sought for 20 years to overcome associations with the former Eastern 
Communist bloc.  
The new members may differ from each other and they are even more different from 
the non-EU members. But despite specifics, the crisis demonstrated clearly that by and 
large the members do currently represent a group with shared characteristics, problems 
and interests — demonstrated at least by the 1 March 2009 pre-pre summit of nine New 
Member States, when they gathered at the Polish embassy in Brussels to help forge a 
common line on the EU’s anti-crisis response.  
 
“De-EU-isation”: a doomsday crisis scenario 
The bottom-line of the “De-EU-isation” scenario  
Under this scenario, the New Member States’ agenda will be drifting away from the 
common policies and institutions of the EU. The scenario will be triggered by growing 
disappointment about EU’s hapless response to their economic troubles. As the crisis 
brings most dire social and political consequences to these countries, the dissent will 
have a large area-effect.  
If the new members continuously find themselves turned away, they will resort to policy 
and institutional solutions outside of the EU. Surely, they will not turn their backs on 
Brussels completely, but will restrict participation to a select set of policies — a first-aid 
kit — that apply strictly to their survival in the turmoil. The areas of interest will be 
limited to keeping the single market, making sure the CAP cash keeps flowing, etc. — 
that is, only the basics and some fringe benefits if possible. Once in motion, these 
trends will carry on beyond the current crisis.  
This scenario does not imply “de-Europeanisation” of the new members or simply “re-
nationalisation” of policies. They will seek to remain European as far as it gets, but the 
EU will lose legitimacy and will be sidelined — possibly giving way to new patterns of 
cooperation.   
The evidence is piling up 
The basic argument is that the current crisis is a “stress-test” that will show who the 
real friends are. As Brussels and the ECB stood aloof, the smaller crisis-stricken 
countries have embraced the lifeline of support offered by the Washington-based IMF.  
When World Bank President Robert Zoellick advocated strongly for EU-driven 
international action to help Eastern Europe, he was given a cold shoulder by the EU. 
Monetary Affairs Commissioner Joaquín Almunia argued that a single solution for the 
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region’s problems is not appropriate because the countries fall into different categories 
— some being EU members and other not. But even this argument does not hold 
completely true as Lithuania (a member) and Serbia (not even a candidate), are 
receiving basically the same kind of treatment. 
The calls for fast entry into the Euro area as the most feasible anti-crisis measure (as 
implied also by the leaked April 2009 IMF report), have been bluntly rejected. The EU 
has clearly been reluctant to use available instruments or develop new ones to help the 
new members in distress.  
It is true that Europeans did foot a huge part of the IMF bill. But refusing to channel 
actions through the EU institutions reinforces the point of EU’s weakness. This situation 
invites an unsavoury analogy to the Bosnia and Kosovo crises, when US-driven NATO 
did the job instead of the EU, which stood on the sidelines.  
How will the centre-periphery tension end up? 
The crisis has affected the countries on the periphery much more severely than the 
affluent countries in the centre of the international economic system, which can 
basically bail their way out of the crisis — alleviating the economic, social and political 
consequences.  
Applied to the EU context, the New Member States did not find the guarantees they 
sought from the centre of their universe — Brussels. This depreciates Brussels’ value 
and opens the door to alternative solutions.  
It is rather hard to tell what these alternatives would be if the centre-periphery 
relations are reconfigured.  
For starters, there is clearly a stronger transatlantic link. The US was at the forefront of 
building liberal democracies and market economies in Central and Eastern Europe in the 
early 1990s. As the region drew closer to EU accession, the transatlantic link and 
sentiments remained but Brussels took precedence. Now the odds are changing once 
again — US Senator John Kerry made the point,  “[w]e can't risk losing 20 years worth 
of gains in the region” in his article “Eastern Europe Needs Our Help” (Wall Street 
Journal, 27 February 2007). It was the US-dominated IMF and the World Bank that 
stepped up to offer encouragement and help.  
This scenario might also give birth to new forms of sub-regional solutions — creation of 
new configurations that might involve “old” members too. One might look to Sweden to 
care for the Baltics, Italy and especially Austria summoning help for the CEE (the 
coincidence with historical patterns is telling and worth a separate discussion). Their 
pleas to the EU have been turned down too, so they may be readily available to join the 
crowd of reluctant members.  
De-EU-isation: the verdict 
This scenario should be avoided. Its unwillingness to engage fully and its tendency to 
outsource troubleshooting to other players may render the EU irrelevant.   
The crisis may be economic at its core, but it will inflict severe political damage to the 
European Union, all but wiping it out as a “grand project”.  
This is all the more possible as it was the major players in the EU, who started to look 
in different directions and retrench to national solutions to the crisis.  
 
“A ‘New Deal’ for the EU”: best-case crisis scenario  
The bottom-line of the “New Deal” scenario  
Under this scenario, the New Member States will invest heftily in the European Union, 
but they will actively seek to introduce changes that make the EU responsive to their 
needs and interests. This will be a reversal of the still residing “asymmetric” attitudes in 
relations within the EU, which are a legacy of the pre-accession negotiation process.  
The ultimate goal will be a “new deal” within the EU that will position the New Member 
States to capitalise better on EU membership. The trigger of this scenario would be 
recognition by new members that the EU remains the primary venue to pursue their 
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interests and, more importantly, that this plan is reciprocated by Brussels and their 
counterparts in the EU. 
The crisis necessitates austerity programmes in every aspect, imposing cuts on “luxury 
goods”. Extending this comparison, the new members will be way choosier about what 
they are offered, what they spend and what they will get in return from the EU. The 
available policy options will be severely scrutinised, which means that new members will 
be more “Policy Drivers” and “Killers” than “Takers”.  
In this scenario, the new members will seek to counterbalance the re-nationalisation of 
policies that dominate the EU now. As the new members will need the EU more than 
ever, and will need it in the best shape possible, they will pursue further consolidation 
and strengthening of the EU. This will entail the baseline scenario described above, 
under which they render support to the common institutions and policies, including the 
supra-national European Commission, while seeking a greater role for themselves in the 
inter-governmental structures.   
Despite that the scenario invokes “solidarity” it entails a lot of interest-based reasoning 
and less sentiment. “EU solidarity” in the harsh context of the economic crisis can be 
interpreted (to put it bluntly) as a request to surplus countries like Germany to deliver 
hard, cold cash for bailing out the rest of the EU. In this case, Germany and the other 
saviours would be saving their export markets. 
Possible benchmarks for this scenario 
Whether the EU will start using and improving the instruments it has at its disposal to 
troubleshoot the crisis, instead of outsourcing this function to the external institutions, 
is the key yardstick for benchmarking this scenario.  
The basic conditions for the scenario are an easy guess: (a) the new members and their 
counterparts should demonstrate some bold vision and leadership and (b) the EU should 
show responsiveness. As these are easier said than done, and are in general in short 
supply now, the benchmarks should be operationalised. It is a daunting task, but some 
may be offered as a food for thought:  
A first possible benchmark would be to see the ECB and Euro area members 
reconfirming their commitment to enlarging the zone by letting into the ERMII all those 
EU countries that want to join. If ECB and Euro area members warm up to enlargement, 
this would represent a very strong case for further integration of the EU. Failure to do 
so would send a signal of a disintegration trend.  
The second benchmark would be holding the line against protectionism and economic 
nationalism. This is fair bet, as so far the New Member States have resisted these 
tendencies with allies such as Germany and the European Commission.  
A third benchmark would be scrapping the remaining transition periods for workers 
from the new members. At this point, this would be more of a goodwill gesture because 
anyway the migrants from the new members are leaving Western Europe and heading 
back home. This would be practical when the Western markets rebound and find a need 
for labour force again. But its substantive meaning is to remove yet another internal 
barrier between “new” and “old”.  
A fourth possible benchmark would be giving a fair deal to new members in the 
upcoming institutional revamping of the European Union and alleviating fears among 
the small and new members that the big states will dominate the agenda of the EU. Can 
there be a “new” President of the European Council?  
Straighten up and fly right: the verdict on the “‘New Deal’ for the EU” scenario 
This is the preferable scenario. The immediate results of swift and direct action, as 
requested by the new members, will alleviate the crisis effects across the board in the 
EU system. The EU would not only avoid a divide, but it will emerge even more 
consolidated internally, with more coherent policies. The demonstration of solidarity and 
commonality of action will invigorate the “European project”. 
In the bigger picture, an irrelevant EU will easily lose the global competition of the 21st 
century. A case in point, the “new global governance framework” of the G20 has several 
EU countries as major members, but the EU itself gave the impression of being an 
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onlooker. The current scenario will give the EU more weight in its desired role as a 
legitimate player in the global order that will follow the crisis.  
The main risk in this otherwise cheerful scenario is to find the right leaders to 
spearhead the process — both within the new members group and the EU as a whole.  
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Supplements 
 
Methodology notes  
The research has been has been carried out by individual researchers in each of the ten 
new members on the basis of specially designed methodology, developed by EUROPEUM 
and major input from EuPI/OSI-Sofia. The seven policy areas under research are:  
I. Internal market/Lisbon Strategy;  
II. Minority integration and citizenship issues;  
III. Energy and climate change;  
IV. Budget review and CAP Health Check;  
V. EU foreign policy and enlargement;  
VI. Freedom, Security and Justice;  
VII. Institutional issues.  
The research was carried out primarily in the period September 2008 – December 2009, 
but there may be references beyond this period. Some positions and circumstances 
described in the reports may have changed since the information was last made 
available to the researchers or reached the stage of publication.    
The researchers’ findings are published in ten country reports on each of the New 
Member States: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
The structure of the country reports includes an overview of the country’s performance 
as an EU member and seven chapters following the seven broad policy areas. Each 
chapter contains an overview of the position of this country in the area, including the 
top three national priorities. Then the chapters provide in-depth analyses, information 
and prognoses on a set of issues (defined as general and specific) within each of the 
seven policy areas. 
The comparative policy report is based mainly on in-depth country reports from the ten 
New Member States, but the responsibility for the analysis, the expressed views and 
conclusions lies with the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Open 
Society Institute – Sofia.  
Classifications: Policy Taker, Killer, and Driver explained 
In the classification of this study, Policy Takers are those states that usually follow the 
mainstream in the EU and in general accept whatever is offered from the EU. The 
reasons may vary — from the lack of stakes and interests in the issue, to the lack of 
capacity to formulate a meaningful position, or they may have a position but lack the 
weight and experience to promote it.  
The Policy Driver is a country that assertively promotes an issue at EU level. Ideally, a 
Policy Driver would have a broad political consensus and public support at home, 
capacity and expertise to advocate successfully, and carry the weight to gather 
coalitions and promote the policy. This may also imply additional legitimacy, measured 
also by the added value of this policy to the “European project” or adherence to the 
“European values” or “common European interest”.  
A Policy Killer is exactly the same as a Policy Driver, but with an opposite sign. In many 
cases, a Policy Killer country becomes a Driver if it succeeds in proposing a feasible and 
viable alternative to the policy it tried to prevent.  
While all members are at some point “Policy Drivers” or “Killers”, the crown of a “super 
Policy Driver” and “super Policy Killer” goes undoubtedly to Poland. Poland, the biggest 
of the new members, with enough self-confidence, has led an effective opposition to the 
Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, and to the energy and climate package. 
The researchers were also asked to provide a forecast for the short and medium-term 
positions and behaviour of the country, based on diverse factors triggering change — 
domestic political change, rise of powerful stakeholders able to promote or kill a policy, 
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a window of opportunity to intervene, reversal of policy at EU level that causes negative 
reaction, etc.  
 
Detailed list of issues for examination 
I. Internal market and Lisbon Strategy 
(Growth and jobs in EC work plan and policy strategy) 
1. Overview  
2. General issues: 
2.1 Review of merger regulations 
2.2 Free movement of workers across the EU and transitional periods 
2.3 Positions on the Strategic Review of the “Better Regulation” package 
(COM(2006) 689) and ECOFIN Conclusions, 22 January 2008; EC Simplification 
Rolling Programme after screening the acquis 
2.4 General views of the free movement of services as enshrined in the current 
Services Directive 
2.5 Positions on taxation harmonisation 
3 Specific issues:  
3.1. Free Small Business Act (SBA) (COM(2007) 592) 
3.2. Financial retail services (SEC(2007) 1520) 
II. Minority integration and citizenship issues  
1. Overview 
2. General Issues: 
2.1. The emerging European Roma Strategy  
2.2. Other minorities’ integration issues  
3. Specific issues: 
3.1. Formulation of action plans to improve housing conditions, create possibilities 
for employment and guarantee affordable health care and education for Roma; 
3.2. Institutionalisation of  European policy on Roma by establishment of  a Roma 
Unit within the EC; 
3.3. Position and policies related to Commission Communication COM(2008) 420 
final from 2 July 2008 on Non-discrimination and Equal Opportunities: A 
Renewed Commitment and also Community Instruments and Policies for Roma 
Inclusion, Staff working document accompanying Commission Communication 
COM(2008) 420. 
III. Energy and climate 
1. Overview  
2. General issues: 
2.1. Strategic energy review (2007) and positions towards 2010-2014 energy 
action plan  
2.2. The post-Kyoto/post-2012 proposals — the global dimension 
2.3. Commitment to meet the benchmarks for greenhouse emissions 
2.4. Strategy and commitment to increase the share of renewable sources 
2.5. Strategy towards nuclear energy  
2.6. Implementation of the revised Emission Trading Scheme  
2.7. External dimension of energy security  
3. Specific issues: 
3.1.  Liberalisation of the energy market — 3rd energy package (unbundling) 
3.2.  Common rules for the internal market in electricity (COM(2007) 508), cross 
border exchanges in electricity (COM(2007) 531), common rules for the 
internal market in gas (COM(2007) 529), access conditions to the gas 
transition network 
3.3. Establishment of the Agency for Co-operation of Energy Regulators 
(COM(2007) 503) 
IV. Budget review and CAP “Health Check” 
1. Overview 
2. General issues:  
2.1. Position towards CAP “Health Check” (COM(2007)722)  
2.2. Positions towards the expenditure structure of post-2013 budget (SEC (2007)  
1188) 
2.3. Position towards Common Market Organisation for Fisheries 
V. EU foreign policy and enlargement 
1. Overview 
2. General issues: 
2.1. Preference of countries for accession and any specific points or concerns 
relating to it (including bilateral disputes and how they might translate into EU-
level policy and decision making)  
2.2. Preference for any particular country in the framework of ENP 
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2.3. Enhanced ESDP, increasing Europe’s defence capabilities etc.  
2.4. Position towards Kosovo, e.g. status and EU mission in Kosovo 
2.5. Transatlantic relations 
3. Specific issues: 
3.1   Completion of accession negotiations with Croatia 
3.2   Opening of accession negotiations with Macedonia 
3.3.  Signing of SAA with Serbia 
3.4.  Blockage of accession talks with Turkey, possibility of unblocking it 
3.5.  Polish–Swedish initiative for ENP Eastern Partnership 
3.6. Strategy for the Black Sea Region/Black Sea Synergy Implementation 
assessment  
3.7. Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region  
3.8. Revision of European Security Strategy 
VI. Freedom, Security and Justice 
1. Overview 
2. General issues: 
2.1. Common European asylum system 
2.2. Common European migration policy 
2.3. Enhanced role in co-operation of law enforcement agencies and their co-
operation at EU level 
2.4. Harmonisation of serious aspects of cross-border crimes  
3. Specific issues: 
3.1. Establishment of Eurosur (European border surveillance system)  
3.2. Establishment of entry–exit system and other border management tools 
3.3. Amendments of asylum-related regulations (2003/9/EC – reception conditions  
for asylum 
seekers, regulation 343/2003 on the determination of Member States 
responsible for assessing asylum applications)  
3.4. Evaluation of FRONTEX and the future developments in this area 
VII. Institutional issues 
1. Overview 
2. General issues: 
2.1. Representation of the country in the EU institutions: EC, European council, EP 
— a backgrounder 
2.2. Position of the country and the different stakeholders (including public opinion) 
towards  
the Lisbon Treaty and the framework of changes introduced by it 
2.3. Alternative proposals to the institutional development of the EU, rated by the 
relative influence of their proponents (e.g. multi-speed Europe, one-voice 
foreign policy, etc.) 
3. Specific issues: 
3.1.  Position towards the main changes offered by the Lisbon Treaty: 
 Extended qualified majority voting; 
 European Parliament’s increased role;  
 President of the European Council; 
 High Representative for Foreign Policy; 
 Revision of the representation in the European Commission;  
 Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding 
3.2.  Implementation of institutional innovations: 
 President of the European Council: competences vis-à-vis the rotating 
presidency, job description, secretariat and its size etc. 
 EU High Representative: competences vis-à-vis the two presidents, 
relation to other commissioners with external relations portfolios, 
competences and relations vis-à-vis the rotating presidency 
 EU External Action Service: Implementation of the EU External Action 
Service:  
3.3.  Future of Lisbon Treaty ratification 
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Country abbreviations  
EU27 European Union - 27 Member States 
BE   Belgium 
CZ  Czech Republic 
BG  Bulgaria 
DK   Denmark 
D-E  East Germany 
DE   Germany 
D-W  West Germany 
EE   Estonia 
EL   Greece 
ES   Spain 
FR   France 
IE   Ireland 
IT   Italy 
CY  Republic of Cyprus * 
CY (tcc) Zone not controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus 
LT   Lithuania 
LV   Latvia 
LU   Luxembourg 
HU   Hungary 
MT   Malta 
NL   Netherlands 
AT   Austria 
PL   Poland 
PT   Portugal 
RO  Romania 
SI   Slovenia 
SK   Slovakia 
FI   Finland 
SE  Sweden 
UK  United Kingdom 
HR   Croatia 
TR  Turkey 
MK  Republic of Macedonia 
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Table of national positions of the new member states on key issues of the EU agenda and an outlook for the short and mid-term 
An experiment with classification and forecasting 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer: please read before proceeding  
In the course of the current study, the country researchers were asked to classify the position and policy behaviour of the country as Policy 
Taker, Policy Driver or Policy Killer on the respective issues. The judgments had to be based on the level and character of activity, interest and 
involvement of the country in the given policy area. The researchers were also asked to provide a forecast for the short and medium-term 
positions and behaviour of the country, based on diverse factors triggering change — domestic political change, rise of powerful stakeholders able 
to promote or kill a policy, a window of opportunity to intervene, reversal of policy at EU level that causes negative reaction, etc.  
The information in the tables below (based on the information provided in the country reports) should be used with caution, as the positions and 
factors at play are nuanced, multifaceted and complex: simplified tick-boxes of classification, presented in the tables below, can never be too 
accurate. From the very beginning, this was intended more for orientation purposes and the provided substantive reports should be 
consulted for a detailed analytical description, as the authors themselves diligently point to several possible explanations and scenarios for 
future development. For example, the tables may present countries such as Slovenia and the Czech Republic much more “policy drivers” than, 
let’s say Poland, which is the undisputed “super policy driver” as shown in the comparative report. But on the other hand, the explanation may be 
that the Czech Republic or Slovenia received their “drivers” status as a result of holding recently the rotating presidencies of the EU. This actually 
supports the case that the rotating presidency status gives an opportunity and experience of even smaller member states to promote the agenda.  
Nevertheless, this is a valuable set of information, based on good expert knowledge and judgment. Further work in this direction would certainly 
have introduced many improvements, but the time necessary for doing this would have made it politically irrelevant by the time it is published. 
Therefore, it was decided to include rather than omit this information in the report and leave it to the readers’ own discretion what use they can 
make out of it.  
 
 
This table contains the distribution of the number of different replies (i.e. policy taker, driver, killer) provided on a given characteristic (i.e. policy 
issues in our case) by the country experts – hence the numbers in the rows below and the percentages in the last columns.  
The legend is: Policy Taker – T; Policy Driver – D; Policy Killer – K. In case there is one more option for the “position”, they are noted with 
small letters: “t” for taker, “d” for driver, “k” for killer. In case no position is provided, it is notes with a blank box.  
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Current positions of the new member states  Outlook: positions of the new members in the short and mid-term 
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Internal Market and Lisbon 
Strategy 
BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI     Internal Market and Lisbon 
Strategy 
BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI     
Review of merger regulations T T T T T T T T T T    Review of merger regulations T T T T T T T T T T    
Free movement of workers  T D T D D T D D D T    Free movement of workers  D D T D K T D D D T    
“Better Regulation”  T D T - T T T T T D    “Better Regulation”  T D T - T T T T T T    
Free movement of services  T D T D D T D T D T    Free movement of services  T D T D D D D D T T    
Taxation harmonization K K K D K T T K K K    Taxation harmonization K K K D K K K K K K    
Small Business Act  T D T T T T D T T T    Small Business Act  T D T T T T D T T T    
Financial retail services  T T T T T T T T T T    Financial retail services  T T T T T T T T T T    
Total/Total % T D T T T T T T T T 68 100% Total/Total % T D T T T T T T T T 68 100% 
Policy Taker (T) 6 2 6 3 4 7 4 5 3 5 45 66% Policy Taker (T) 6 3 6 3 4 7 4 5 4 4 46 68% 
Policy Driver (D) 0 4 0 3 2 0 3 1 2 1 16 24% Policy Driver (D) 0 4 0 3 2 0 3 1 1 1 15 22% 
Policy Killer (K) 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 7 10% Policy Killer (K) 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 7 10% 
Minority integration and 
citizenship issues 
BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI     Minority integration and 
citizenship issues 
BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI     
The emerging European Roma 
Strategy 
T T T D T T T D T T    The emerging European Roma 
Strategy 
K T T D T T T D T T    
Other minorities’ integration 
issues 
T - T D - T T T T T    Other minorities’ integration 
issues 
T - D D - T T K T T    
Formulation of action plans D T T T T T T D T T    Formulation of action plans D T T T T T T D T T    
Institutionalization of  
European policy on Roma 
T - T D T T T D T T    Institutionalization of  
European policy on Roma 
T - T D T T T D T T    
Non-discrimination and equal 
opportunities 
T K/t T T T T T T T T     Non-discrimination and equal 
opportunities 
T K T T T T T T T T     
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Total/Total % T T T D T T T D T T 47 100% Total/Total % T T T D T T T D T T 47 100% 
Policy Taker (T) 4 2 5 2 4 5 5 2 5 5 39 83% Policy Taker (T) 5 2 4 2 4 5 5 1 5 5 38 81% 
Policy Driver (D) 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 7 15% Policy Driver (D) 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 7 15% 
Policy Killer (K) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2% Policy Killer (K) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 4% 
Energy/climate change BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI     Energy/climate change BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI     
Strategic energy 
review/energy action plan 
T D T T D T T D T T     Strategic energy 
review/energy action plan 
D D T T D D T D T T     
The post-Kyoto/post-2012 
proposals 
D T T T D T D D T D     The post-Kyoto/post-2012 
proposals 
D D T T D K D K T D     
Benchmarks for greenhouse 
emissions 
T T T T D/k T K/t K T T     Benchmarks for greenhouse 
emissions 
D T T T K T T K T T     
Share of renewable sources K K T T D T D T D T     Share of renewable sources D K D T D T T T T T     
Strategy towards nuclear 
energy 
D D T T T T T T D D     Strategy towards nuclear 
energy 
D D T D T T T D D D     
Revised Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
D K T T D T D T D T     Revised Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
D D T T D K D T D T     
External dimension of energy 
security 
K D D D D D D D D K     External dimension of energy 
security 
K D T D D D D D D T     
 3rd energy package 
(unbundling) 
K T K T D T T T K/d D      3rd energy package 
(unbundling) 
D T K T D D T T T T     
Common rules for the internal 
market 
T D D T D T T T K/d T     Common rules for the internal 
market 
K D K T D D T T T T     
 Agency for Co-operation of 
Energy Regulators 
T D T D T T T T K/t T      Agency for Co-operation of 
Energy Regulators 
T D T D T D T T D/t T     
Total/Total % T D T T D T T T D T 101 100% Total/Total % D D T T D D T T D T 100 100% 
Policy Taker (T) 4 3 7 8 2 9 5 6 3 6 53 52% Policy Taker (T) 1 2 7 7 2 3 7 5 6 6 46 46% 
Policy Driver (D) 3 5 2 2 9 1 4 3 4 3 36 36% Policy Driver (D) 7 7 1 3 7 5 3 3 4 4 44 44% 
Policy Killer (K) 3 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 1 12 12% Policy Killer (K) 2 1 2 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 10 10% 
Budget review and CAP 
health check 
BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI     Budget review and CAP 
health check 
BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI     
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CAP “Health Check” D D/t T T D T T T K T     CAP “Health Check” D K T T K T K T K T     
Common Market Organization 
for Fisheries 
T T T - D T T T T T     Common Market Organization 
for Fisheries 
T T T - D T D T T T     
Expenditure structure of post-
2013 budget 
T D T T D T D T D T     Expenditure structure of post-
2013 budget 
D K D T D D D T D T     
Total/Total % T D T T D T T T = T 29 100% Total/Total % D K T T D T D T = T 29 100% 
Policy Taker (T) 2 1 3 2 0 3 2 3 1 0 17 59% Policy Taker (T) 1 1 2 2 0 2 1 3 1 0 13 45% 
Policy Driver (D) 1 2 0 0 3 0 1 0 1 3 11 38% Policy Driver (D) 2 0 1 0 2 1 2 0 1 3 12 41% 
Policy Killer (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3% Policy Killer (K) 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 14% 
EU foreign policy and 
enlargement 
BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI     EU foreign policy and 
enlargement 
BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI     
Preference for accession 
countries 
T/d D T/d T D T D T D D     Preference for accession 
countries 
T/d D T/d T D D D T D D     
Preference for a ENP country  T D T T D T D D D T     Preference for a ENP country  D D D T D D D D D T     
Enhanced ESDP T T T T T T D T T T     Enhanced ESDP T T T T K D D T T T     
Position towards Kosovo D T D T D T T K/t K/d D     Position towards Kosovo T T D T D T T K/t K/d D     
Transatlantic relations T D/t D T T T T T T T     Transatlantic relations T D/t D T T D T T T T     
Accession negotiations with 
Croatia 
T D T D D T T T D T     Accession negotiations with 
Croatia 
T D D D D D T T D T     
Opening of negotiations with 
Macedonia 
T D T T T T T K T D     Opening of negotiations with 
Macedonia 
T D D T T T T K D/t D     
Signing of SAA with Serbia T D T D T T T D D D     Signing of SAA with Serbia T D T D T D T D D D     
Accession talks with Turkey T T D T T T T T T T     Accession talks with Turkey T/k D D T T T K T T T     
Eastern Partnership T D T D D T D D T T     Eastern Partnership T D D D D D D D D T     
Strategy for the Black Sea 
Region 
D T T T T T K D T T     Strategy for the Black Sea 
Region 
D T T T T T T D T T     
Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region 
T T T T D T D T T T     Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region 
T T D T D T D T T T     
Revision of European Security 
Strategy 
T T T T T T D T T T     Revision of European Security 
Strategy 
T T T T K D D T T T     
Total/Total % T D T T D T D T T T 130 100% Total/Total % T D D T T D D T D T 130 100% 
Policy Taker (T) 11 6 10 10 6 13 6 7 8 9 87 67% Policy Taker (T) 11 5 5 10 5 5 6 7 6 9 69 53% 
Policy Driver (D) 2 7 3 3 7 0 6 4 4 4 39 30% Policy Driver (D) 2 8 8 3 6 8 6 4 6 4 55 42% 
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Policy Killer (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 4 3% Policy Killer (K) 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 1 0 6 5% 
Freedom, Security and 
Justice 
BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI     Freedom, Security and 
Justice 
BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI     
Common European asylum 
policy 
T K/t T T T T T T T T     Common European asylum 
policy 
T K/t K T T K T T T T     
Common European migration 
policy 
T K/t T T T T T T T T     Common European migration 
policy 
T K/t T T K K D/t T T T     
Law enforcement agencies T K/t T T T T T T D D     Law enforcement agencies T K/t T T T T D T D D     
Serious aspects of cross-
border crimes  
T K/t T T T T T T T T     Serious aspects of cross-
border crimes  
T T T T T T T T T T     
Establishment of Eurosur T T T T T T T T T T     Establishment of Eurosur T T T T T D T T T D     
Entry – exit system T T T T T T T T T T     Entry – exit system T K T T T D K T T T     
Amendments of asylum – 
related regulations 
T K T T T T T T T T     Amendments of asylum 
regulations 
T K T T T K T T T D     
Evaluation of FRONTEX T K T D T T T T D D     Evaluation of FRONTEX T K T D T D T T D D     
Total/Total % T K T T T T T T T T 80 100% Total/Total % T K T T T D T T T D 82 100% 
Policy Taker (T) 8 2 8 7 8 8 8 8 6 6 69 86% Policy Taker (T) 8 2 7 7 7 3 4 8 6 4 56 68% 
Policy Driver (D) 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 11 14% Policy Driver (D) 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 0 2 4 14 17% 
Policy Killer (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% Policy Killer (K) 0 6 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 12 15% 
Institutional issues BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI     Institutional issues BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI     
Positions towards the Lisbon 
Treaty 
T K/d T T T T D T D T     Positions towards the Lisbon 
Treaty 
T K T T T T D T D T     
Alternatives to EU 
development 
K T T T D T T T K T     Alternatives to EU 
development 
K T T T D T T T K K     
Extended qualified majority 
voting 
T T T T T T T T T T     Extended qualified majority 
voting 
T T T T T T T T T T     
European Parliament 
increased role 
T T T T T T T T T T     European Parliament 
increased role 
T T T T T T D T T T     
President of the European 
Council 
T T T T T T T T T T     President of the European 
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Revision of the  European 
Commission 
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Total/Total % T T T T T T T T T T 120 100% Total/Total % T T T T T T D T T T 120 100% 
Policy Taker (T) 11 10 12 12 9 12 10 12 7 12 107 89% Policy Taker (T) 10 10 10 12 7 8 9 11 7 11 95 79% 
Policy Driver (D) 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 4 0 9 8% Policy Driver (D) 0 1 0 0 5 4 2 0 3 0 15 13% 
Policy Killer (K) 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 3% Policy Killer (K) 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 10 8% 
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A histogram of distribution of expert replies by policy area: current state 
Positions of the new members: current state of affairs
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Policy Taker 66% 83% 52% 59% 67% 86% 89%
Policy Driver 24% 15% 36% 38% 30% 14% 8%
Policy Killer 10% 2% 12% 3% 3% 0% 3%
Market Minorities Energy CAP Foreign policy JHA Institutions
 
 
A histogram of distribution of expert replies by policy area: an outlook   
Positions of new members: short and mid-term outlook
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Policy Taker 68% 81% 46% 45% 53% 68% 79%
Policy Driver 22% 15% 44% 41% 42% 17% 13%
Policy Killer 10% 4% 10% 14% 5% 15% 8%
Market Minorities Energy CAP Foreign policy JHA Institutions
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This EuPI project has been implemented in close partnership with EUROPEUM 
Institute for European Policy, with funding provided by the Open Society Institute – 
Sofia.  
 
About EuPI   
The European Policy Initiative (EuPI) of the Open Society Institute – Sofia aims at 
stimulating and assisting the New Member States from CEE to develop capacity for 
constructive co-authorship of common European policies at both government and civil 
society level. As a new priority area of the European Policies and Civic Participation 
Program of Open Society Institute – Sofia, EuPI will contribute to improving the 
capacity of New Member States to effectively impact common European policies through 
quality research, policy recommendations, networking and advocacy. The initiative 
operates in the ten New Member States from CEE through a network of experts and 
policy institutes.  
Address: 
Open Society Institute – Sofia 
European Policies Initiative (EuPI) 
56 Solunska Str. 
Sofia 1000 
Tel.: (+359 2) 930 66 19 
Fax: (+359 2) 951 63 48 
E-mail: eupi@osi.bg 
Web EuPI: www.eupi.eu  
Web OSI-Sofia: www.osi.bg  
About EUROPEUM           
EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy is a non-profit, non-partisan and independent 
institute. It focuses on the issues of European integration and its impact on the 
transformation of political, economic and legal milieu in the Czech Republic. EUROPEUM 
strives to contribute to a long-lasting development of democracy, security, stability, 
freedom and solidarity across Europe. EUROPEUM formulates opinions and offers 
alternatives to internal reforms in the Czech Republic with a view of ensuring her full-
fledged membership and respected position in the European Union. 
Address: 
EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy 
Rytířská 31 
Praha 1, 110 00 
Czech Republic 
Tel.: (+420) 221.610.206-7 
Fax: (+420) 221.610.204 
Web: www.europeum.org 
 
Comparative Policy Report 
www.eupi.eu 
69
 
 
EuPI major publications in 2009  
  
*The EU New Member States as Agenda Setters in the Enlarged European Union 
 
*The Unfinished Business of the Fifth Enlargement 
 
*Economic and Political Challenges of Acceding to the Euro area in the post-Lehman 
Brothers’ World 
 
 
Please, check EuPI’s web-site at www.eupi.eu for new publications, policy briefs, and events.  
 
 
 
